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Prepared for the Boston University JSTL Symposium “Bridging the Gap between the Federal Courts and the USPTO,” this article evaluates claims that
adjudication of the validity of issued patents in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office is unconstitutional. The constitutional challenges result
from the expansion of administrative options to challenge and cancel issued
patents in the America Invents Act of 2011 and have received favorable reception within the patent community and garnered at least some attention from the
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court. This positive reception is surprising because the constitutional challenges are legally quite weak.
Although the challenges contend that Article III prohibits administrative adjudication of issued patents, the Patent Office review procedures involve limited review of federal statutory rights in a specialized area of law within the
Patent Office’s expertise and in furtherance of the Patent Office’s core regula-
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tory objective in evaluating and issuing patent claims. Supreme Court precedent indicates that Congress can use its Article I powers to opt for administrative adjudication in such circumstances without any Article III barriers. This
is confirmed by the fact that Article III courts retain significant power over patent validity issues, both on direct review from the Patent Office cancellation
proceedings and through the parallel track for challenging patent validity in
district court litigation.
Nor is a challenge based on the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
likely to succeed, as the Supreme Court has indicated that in the administrative
context the Seventh Amendment issue is subsumed by the Article III analysis.
The Takings and IP Clauses also would not bar Patent Office adjudication and
cancellation of issued patents (and have only been raised in passing). In sum,
because the Patent Office review procedures for issued patents are well within
the mainstream of modern administrative adjudication, a finding that administrative patent cancellation is unconstitutional would not just undo Congress’s
policy choices for the patent system but would also threaten large swaths of the
administrative state.
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Introduction
The America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”) significantly altered the distribution of power within the patent system. In particular, the AIA created several
new procedures by which the validity of issued patents can be challenged in
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent Office” or “PTO”).
These procedures have proven very popular, with the docket of the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), the part of the Patent Office that resolves these
challenges, beginning to rival the patent docket of the federal district courts.1
In the post-AIA patent system, the PTAB undoubtedly challenges the federal
courts’ traditional primacy in adjudicating matters involving issued patents.
Like any redistribution of power, the expansion of the Patent Office’s power
over issued patents has created dissatisfaction in some quarters. The high rates
of invalidation in the PTAB sparked, at least initially, significant concern in
the patent community, resulting in the overly dramatic characterization of the
PTAB panels as “death squads killing property rights.”2 Commentators also
expressed concerns about supposedly inconsistent results in parallel federal
court litigation and PTAB proceedings, with the PTAB invalidating patent
claims even after a district court judgment rejected the invalidity challenge.3
Some have worried that serial challenges to patents in the PTAB and courts
might constitute problematic harassment from a policy perspective.4
Perhaps unsurprisingly, others dissatisfied with the AIA’s redistribution of
power in the patent system have not limited themselves to questioning Congress’s policy choices or advocating for statutory revocation of, or modifications to, the AIA post-issuance proceedings. Rather, they have resorted to constitutional challenges to administrative adjudication and cancellation of issued
patents. These challenges primarily contend that Patent Office post-issuance
review is unconstitutional because the PTAB judges lack the security of employment and salary that Article III mandates for federal judges and because
the PTAB proceedings lack the jury trial rights provided for in the Seventh
Amendment.5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit squarely rejected
these challenges in MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co.6 However,
litigants continue to make constitutional challenges to Patent Office post1

John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO As Prime Mover, 65 DUKEL.J.
1657, 1666-67 (2016).
2 Id. at 1668.
3 Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)Valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 277 (2016).
4 See Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 68 (2016).
5 See infra Part I.B.
6 MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015) [hereinafter MCM Portfolio].
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issuance review.7 These challenges have made some progress at both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court “relisted” two certiorari petitions challenging Patent Office post-issuance review for consideration
at a second conference, which normally indicates that the Court is relatively
close to granting certiorari.8 In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court called
for a response to the certiorari petition from the United States after the United
States had waived its response.9 The Federal Circuit denied initial hearing en
banc in a case involving a constitutional challenge to Patent Office postissuance review but did so over the vigorous dissents of two judges.10 The
constitutional challenges to Patent Office post-issuance review also have received favorable receptions in leading patent law media outlets.11
All of this positive attention is somewhat puzzling. The constitutional challenges to administrative adjudication and cancellation of issued patent rights
are legally quite weak. Although the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate
a clear and consistent test for when adjudication by administrative agencies is
permissible under Article III, Patent Office post-issuance review falls comfortably within the mainstream of administrative adjudication.12 To strike this
type of adjudication down as unconstitutional under Article III would not just
disturb Congress’s policy choices for the patent system but would also threaten
significant, well-established portions of the modern administrative state.
More specifically, Supreme Court precedent supports at least three analyti7 See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Whether a Patent Right Is a Public Right, PATENTLYO (Feb.
16,
2017),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/02/whether-patent-public.html
[https://perma.cc/PBL5-SRBY] (describing new challenge at the Federal Circuit).
8
See John Elwood, Relist Watch, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 6, 2016),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/10/relist-watch-88/ [https://perma.cc/SW2A-NRFC].
9 Kelcee Griffis, Justices Want USPTO to Weigh in on PTAB Constitutionality, LAW360
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/896824/justices-want-uspto-to-weigh-inon-ptab-constitutionality [https://perma.cc/X5VU-FCQA].
10 Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson Am. Inc., Nos. 2017-1517, 1518, —-F.3d—-, slip
op. (Fed Cir. May 11, 2017).
11 Crouch, supra note 7 (suggesting that 19th century Supreme Court case supports unconstitutionality); Robert P. Greenspoon, Conservative Ideology Will Rebuild the Patent
System,
IPWATCHDOG
(Jan.
30,
2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/30/conservative-ideology-rebuild-patentsystem/id=77717/ [https://perma.cc/9TZ3-MAU9] (describing Federal Circuit’s MCM Portfolio decision as having “oxymoronically labeled the private property of an invention patent
as a ‘public right,’ a label calculated to salvage clearly unconstitutional aspects of the 2011
America Invents Act (AIA)”); see also Michael Rothwell, Patents and Public Rights: The
Questionable Constitutionality of Patents Before Article I Tribunals After Stern v. Marshall,
13 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 287 (2012) (evaluating favorably Article III and Seventh Amendment
arguments).
12 See infra Part II.
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cal frameworks for evaluating whether non-Article III adjudication is permissible – Article III appellate review, public rights versus private rights, and policy-oriented balancing – with uncertainty as to the exact relationship between
them.13 Administrative adjudication and cancellation of issued patents is clearly constitutional under any of these frameworks. In particular, patent rights are
rights created by federal statute over which Congress has significant power to
specify the forum for adjudication; post-issuance review advances the expert
Patent Office’s primary regulatory function of evaluating and issuing patents;
PTAB adjudication is limited to only some issues within a specialized area of
law and the PTAB’s powers are limited to cancellation of patents; ample Article III appellate review of the PTAB’s decisions exists; the power of the Article III district courts to consider patent validity remains virtually untouched;
and patentees have demonstrated at least some measure of consent by choosing
to participate in the patent system (rather than using non-patent means to protect their inventions) despite knowing of the possibility of administrative adjudication and cancellation of issued patents.14 Nor is the Seventh Amendment a
barrier to Patent Office post-issuance review because, in the administrative
context, the Seventh Amendment imposes no greater limits on agency adjudication than does Article III.15
The constitutionality of administrative adjudication and cancellation of issued patents is not free from any doubt – the indeterminacy of the precedent in
this area makes that impossible. In particular, the Patent Office has a less significant regulatory function than other administrative agencies that, under Supreme Court precedent, may make its adjudicatory functions more troubling.16
More significantly, unlike the independent agencies at issue in prior Supreme
Court cases upholding administrative adjudication, the PTAB is part of an executive branch agency run by political appointees who serve at the pleasure of
the President, and the PTAB judges owe their jobs, salaries, and performance
reviews to political appointees.17 This raises greater concerns about the potential for partiality and political domination of the PTAB, the very concerns that
Article III seeks to avoid. Although these issues are not insignificant, they are
outweighed by the other factors demonstrating that Patent Office post-issuance
review is well within the permissible scope of administrative adjudication under Article III.
In arguing otherwise, the recent constitutional challenges to AIA postissuance review focus on three flawed arguments. First, in an argument that
smacks of the type of patent exceptionalism that the Supreme Court has re13
14
15
16
17

See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.C.2.
See infra Part III.D.2.
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peatedly rejected, the challenges sidestep the Supreme Court’s modern Article
III precedent by contending that an (at best) ambiguous 19th century case already held administrative adjudication and cancellation of issued patents to be
unconstitutional.18 Second, these claims incorrectly conflate the “private property” status of patent rights with the “private rights” within the meaning of the
Article III precedent that are less susceptible to administrative adjudication.19
Third, the challenges incorrectly contend that because patent validity may have
been litigated in courts at law in 1789, it is a common law claim less susceptible than federal statutory rights to Article III adjudication.20 In truth, the constitutional challenges seem less focused on a careful analysis of the Supreme
Court precedent than on dissatisfaction with Congress’s policy choices in creating and structuring Patent Office post-issuance review.21
To be clear, this Article provides only a descriptive, doctrinal analysis of the
constitutionality of administrative adjudication and cancellation of issued patents. The goal is to evaluate the constitutional challenges and predict the likely outcome. For that reason, this Article takes Supreme Court precedent at
face value, without questioning whether the precedent is right or wrong. For
example, this Article accepts the Supreme Court’s prior description of the patent system as a pervasive regulatory scheme, without questioning whether the
Supreme Court’s characterization is correct. Likewise, the Article does not
make any normative judgments about the wisdom of either the Supreme
Court’s Article III precedent or Congress’s policy choices in creating Patent
Office post-issuance review proceedings. Finally, the Article does not address
whether specific procedures or practices in PTAB adjudication violate procedural due process rights. The sole question addressed is whether Patent Office
post-issuance review was within Congress’s power to create or whether it is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Part I provides an overview of administrative adjudication and cancellation
of issued patents, as well as the constitutional challenges that have been raised
to it. Part II evaluates the constitutional challenges under Article III. Part III
evaluates the constitutional challenges under the Seventh Amendment, as well
as less common arguments that Patent Office post-issuance review constitutes
an unconstitutional taking of private property or violates the powers given to
Congress in the IP Clause.

18

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.C.1.
20 See infra Part II.C.1.
21 Cf. Greg Reilly, How Can the Supreme Court Not “Understand” Patent Law?, 16
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 292 (2017) (suggesting that contentions that the Supreme Court
does not understand patent law really reflect disagreement with the Supreme Court’s policy
choices for patent law).
19
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I. THE CONTEXT FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF POST-ISSUANCE REVIEW
The traditional distribution of power within the patent system assigned the
Patent Office the primary role of reviewing patent applications and issuing patents, and the Article III courts the primary role of adjudicating cases involving
issued patents. The Patent Office has long had an additional, small role in adjudicating the validity of issued patents, but over the past forty years, and especially since enactment of the AIA, that role has greatly expanded. As the Patent Office has moved into the realm previously assigned to the Article III
courts, those dissatisfied with Congress’s restructuring of the patent system
and/or the results of Patent Office validity decisions have increasingly challenged the constitutionality of the Patent Office’s expanded role in adjudicating the validity of issued patents, particularly under Article III and the Seventh
Amendment. This Part provides the context for evaluating these constitutional
challenges, providing first an overview of administrative adjudication and cancellation of issued patents and then an overview of the recent constitutional
challenges.
A. Administrative Challenges to Issued Patents
1. Modern Patent Office Post-Issuance Review
For most of its history, the patent system has had two primary prongs. First,
patent rights are acquired through an application and examination process in
the Patent Office, an executive branch administrative agency within the United
States Department of Commerce, to determine whether the statutory requirements for obtaining a patent have been satisfied.22 Second, patent rights are
enforced through infringement lawsuits in the ordinary Article III federal district courts throughout the country, which determine both whether the defendant is violating the exclusive rights provided by the patent and whether the patent meets the statutory requirements and should have issued in the first place
(“validity”).23 Decisions in each context can be appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, an Article III court with nationwide jurisdiction over patent appeals, and then potentially to the Supreme Court.24
More recently, Congress has altered the long-standing structure of the patent
system by introducing several procedures by which patents can be challenged
in the Patent Office after issuance as erroneously granted, procedures that have

22

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-123 (2010); Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic
Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 77-79 (2005).
23 ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 51-55 (6th ed. 2013).
24 Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 474 (2011) (stating that during patent acquisition, only patent denials, not grants, can be appealed).
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proven very popular. These post-issuance proceedings effectively create a
third prong to the patent system distinct from both patent acquisition and patent enforcement: administrative challenges to issued patents. Like patent examination and litigation, decisions in post-issuance proceedings can be appealed to the Federal Circuit and potentially the Supreme Court. The current
structure of the patent system is depicted in the following chart.

The modern history of Patent Office post-issuance review began in 1981,
when Congress created ex parte reexamination procedures. Any person can
file a request for ex parte reexamination, and the Patent Office institutes reexamination if there is “a substantial new question of patentability” for lack of
novelty or non-obviousness based on printed prior art.25 The process of ex
parte reexamination is similar to initial examination, proceeding ex parte between the patentee and the patent examiner, without any participation from the
requester or other interested parties.26 At the end of reexamination, the challenged patent claims are either confirmed, cancelled, or amended.27 A patentee
can appeal a decision adverse to patentability to the Federal Circuit. Consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Circuit’s review is
25

See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 2209
(9th ed. 2015) [hereinafter MPEP], https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/
[https://perma.cc/B8UQ-HPRW].
26 See id.
27 35 U.S.C. § 307 (2010).
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limited to the administrative record, with questions of law reviewed de novo
and factual findings for substantial evidence.28
In 1999, Congress added a second form of post-issuance review – inter
partes reexamination – initiated and conducted similarly to ex parte reexamination.29 The major difference for present purposes was that the party requesting
inter partes reexamination was allowed to participate by filing written comments addressing examiner decisions or patentee responses and was permitted
to appeal adverse decisions to the Federal Circuit.30
The America Invents Act of 2011 substantially changed and expanded Patent Office post-issuance proceedings. It replaced inter partes reexamination
with inter partes review as of September 16, 2012.31 Inter partes review allows
any party to challenge an issued patent for lack of novelty or non-obviousness
based on printed prior art from nine months after the patent issues through the
life of the patent.32 Inter partes review is instituted if it is “more likely than not
that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”33 Inter
partes review differs from initial examination and reexamination in that it is an
adversarial proceeding involving both the patentee and requester that includes
discovery, an oral hearing, and other court-like features.34 It also proceeds before a three judge panel of the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB), rather
than before a patent examiner.35
The AIA added three other post-issuance proceedings. First, post grant review allows any party to challenge a patent on any basis within nine months of
issuance.36 Post grant review is initiated and conducted similarly to inter
partes review.37 Second, covered business method patent review (a temporary
program lasting until 2020) allows a party accused of patent infringement to
28

35 U.S.C. § 306 (2011); In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (2008) [hereinafter
Swanson]; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966)(providing general standards for appellate review
of administrative agency action); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) [hereinafter
Dickinson] (holding review of Patent Office decisions subject to the APA).
29 See MPEP, supra note 25, at § 2609.
30 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(b)(2), 315(b) (2010), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act (Sept. 16, 2011).
31 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2013).
32 A party cannot challenge a patent in inter partes review if it previously filed a civil
action challenging the patent. See Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 609,
634-35 (2012).
33 Id. at 634.
34 Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for
the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1981-83 (2013).
35 Id. at 1974.
36 Tran, supra note 32, at 631-632.
37 Id. at 633-34.
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file a challenge in the Patent Office on any basis for patentability, but only if
the patent covers “a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data
processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include
patents for technological inventions.”38 Covered business method patent review is initiated and proceeds similarly to post grant review and inter partes
review.39 Third, derivation proceedings allow a party to challenge a patent or
patent application within one year of the application’s publication on the
ground that the subject matter of a claim was derived, or copied, from the challenger.40 Like the other AIA procedures, derivation proceedings occur before
the PTAB with trial-like procedures.41
Decisions in inter partes review, post grant review, and covered business
method patent review can be appealed by either party to the Federal Circuit.42
Like reexamination, the Federal Circuit reviews these decisions pursuant to ordinary APA appellate review standards: substantial evidence for factual findings and de novo for legal conclusions.43 Derivation decisions also can be appealed to the Federal Circuit.44 Additionally, however, a party dissatisfied
with the outcome in derivation, like a dissatisfied patent applicant, can file a
civil action challenging the decision and is not limited to the administrative
record in the civil action.45 When no additional evidence is introduced in the
civil action, the district court must apply the standard APA appellate review
standards, but when new evidence is introduced, the district court reviews the
relevant factual issues de novo.46
2. Administrative Post-Issuance Review Before Reexamination
Commentators commonly contend that “[f]or most of American history
38

Id. at 636-37.
Id. at 636.
40 Id. at 635.
41 Id.
42 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2011) (inter partes review); 35 U.S.C. § 329 (2011) (post grant review); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(2), 125 Stat. 284,
331 (2011) (covered business method patent review).
43 Merck & Cie v. Gnosis SpA, 808 F. 3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Merck &
Cie v. Gnosis SpA, 820 F.3d 432, 434 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (O’Malley, J., concurring in denial
of rehearing en banc) (noting that these appellate review standards apply to all PTAB decisions).
44 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2011).
45 Id.
46 See Troy v. Samson Mfg. Corp., 758 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014) [hereinafter
Troy], reh’g en banc denied (interpreting prior version of Section 146 involving interferences).
39

THIS VERSION MAY CONTAIN INACCURATE OR INCOMPLETE PAGE
NUMBERS. PLEASE CONSULT THE PRINT OR ONLINE DATABASE
VERSIONS FOR THE PROPER CITATION INFORMATION.

2017]

Administrative Patent Cancellation

387

[prior to enactment of ex parte reexamination], the patent agency (whether
USPTO or otherwise) had no authority to cancel an issued patent.”47 This is
not entirely accurate.48
Since at least 1836, both applications and issued patents (filed before the effective date of the AIA, which switched to a first-to-file system) have been
subject to interference proceedings in the Patent Office to decide which of
competing claimants has priority and entitlement to the patent as the first inventor of the claimed subject matter.49 Prior to 1952, the Patent Office did not
have the power to cancel an issued patent in an interference, even when it
found the patentee was not the first to invent and therefore was not entitled to
the patent.50 Rather, the prevailing party was required to file suit to obtain a
wholesale cancellation of the patent.51 Yet, even before 1952, “the power of
47

Jarrad Wood & Jonathan R. K. Stroud, Three Hundred Nos: An Empirical Analysis of
the First 300+ Denials of Institution for Inter Partes and Covered Business Method Patent
Reviews Prior to In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 112, 115 (2015).
48 In addition to the interferences discussed in the text, the International Trade Commission, an administrative agency, also makes determinations of patent validity as part of its
unfair trade practices investigations. However, ITC determinations of invalidity (even if
affirmed by the Federal Circuit) do not actually result in cancelled patents, and ITC determinations have no preclusive effect in other proceedings because the ITC’s expertise is on
trade, not patent, issues. Tandon Corp. v. ITC, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Also,
from 1977-1982, the Patent Office allowed patentees to get an advisory opinion on patentability via a reissue proceeding, even without any admitted defect in the patent. Because the
outcome was merely advisory, it also did not result in patent cancellation. Mark D. Janis,
Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 17-19 (1997).
49 Patent Act of 1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, § 8, 5 Stat. 117, 120-21 (1836). The Patent
Act of 1793 also provided for interferences but only expressly references applications, so it
is unclear as to whether its interference procedures also applied when one of the involved
claimants held an already issued patent. Patent Act of 1793, Pub. L. No. 2-11, § 9, 1 Stat.
318, 323-24 (1793).
50 See Ewing v. United States ex rel. Fowler Car Co., 45 App.D.C. 185, 189 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1916) (noting that the Patent Office “has no power to cancel a patent” in an interference). Earlier versions of this paper posted to SSRN made incorrect assumptions about the
power of the Patent Office to cancel issued patents in interferences prior to 1952. These
incorrect assumptions were brought to my attention, and I was pushed to explore the matter
in more depth and more precisely by Michael I. Rothwell, After MCM, A Second Look: Article I Invalidation of Issued Patents for Intellectual Property Still Likely Unconstitutional
After Stern v. Marshall, 18 N.C. J. LAW & TECH. 1, 18-20 (2017). As explained in the text,
however, Rothwell is incorrect in his statement that “[i]t appears that the USPTO’s interference proceedings were first empowered to invalidate issued patents by a November 8, 1984
amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (pre-AIA).” Id. at 20.
51 William Redin Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System As a Problem of
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the Patent Office to institute interference proceedings” did give it “an indirect
control over issued patents.”52 A finding against an issued patent in an interference apparently “remov[ed] . . . the prima facie presumption of validity and
establish[ed] between the parties, on the issue of priority, a presumption which
only evidence carrying ‘thorough conviction’ can overcome.”53
The Patent Act of 1952 included a provision “new in substance” that provided that “a final judgment adverse to a patentee, subject to appeal or other
review provided, constitutes cancellation of the claims involved from the patent.”54 This provision remained virtually unchanged until interferences were
rendered obsolete by the America Invent Act’s move to a first-to-file system.55
Thus, upon exhaustion of all appeals, the Patent Office’s determination against
a patentee in an interference constituted the cancellation of claims of an issued
patent. This cancellation was a post-issuance patentability decision by the Patent Office, as it was based on a finding of lack of novelty under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102.56 Thus, for sixty-five years, the Patent Office has had the authority to
cancel an issued patent for lack of patentability, albeit on more limited grounds
(prior invention by a competing application) than under the modern postissuance review procedures. Long before that, the Patent Office could significantly affect the validity of issued patents through its interferences decisions.
Arguably, cancellation of patent rights in an interference differs from cancellation in the AIA post-issuance proceedings (except derivation) because the
losing party in interferences had the option of filing a civil action in federal
district court challenging the Patent Office’s decision, rather than just seeking
direct appellate review.57 However, the Supreme Court made clear as early as
1894 that the district court did not truly resolve the priority issue de novo. RaAdministrative Law, 55 HARV. L. REV. 950, 971 (1942).
52 Id. at 963 n. 46.
53 Id. at 971.
54 P. J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK SOC.
161, 198 (1993) (reprinted from version originally published in 1954); see also Patent Act
of 1952 § 135, P.L. 593, 66 Stat. 792, 802 (July 19, 1952).
55 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2010), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (Sept. 16,
2011).
56 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1) (2008), (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1) (2012)) (preAIA version).
57 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 16, 5 Stat. 117, 123-24 (1836) (providing for remedy
by bill of equity); 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2008), (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2012)) (preAIA version) (“Any party to an interference dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences on the interference, may have remedy by civil action.”);
Troy, 758 F.3d at 1327 (describing history of statutory provisions providing civil action to
challenge interference decision). The 1793 Act provided for interferences to be resolved by
a panel of three arbitrators, with their decision final, though again the 1793 Act was ambiguous on its face as to whether interferences involved issued patents.

THIS VERSION MAY CONTAIN INACCURATE OR INCOMPLETE PAGE
NUMBERS. PLEASE CONSULT THE PRINT OR ONLINE DATABASE
VERSIONS FOR THE PROPER CITATION INFORMATION.

2017]

Administrative Patent Cancellation

389

ther, because the district court challenge “is an application to the court to set
aside the action of one of the executive departments of the government” that is
“charged with the administration of the patent system” and is “a special tribunal, entrusted with full power in the premises,” the Patent Office’s determination “must be accepted as controlling” unless the evidence is “of a character or
sufficient to produce a clear conviction that the Patent Office made a mistake
in awarding priority of invention to the defendant.”58 This standard appears to
have been equally applicable when the interference involved an issued patent.59
In Dickinson v. Zurko, the Supreme Court characterized this standard as the
pre-APA equivalent of the typical standards for court review of agency action
adopted by the APA,60 i.e., the standards that apply to the modern postissuance review procedures.
Based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the related provision permitting a dissatisfied patent applicant to file a civil action, the Federal Circuit has
now limited the district court’s deferential review in civil actions challenging
interference results to cases in which no new evidence is introduced in the civil
action, holding that a district court should review factual findings de novo
when new evidence is introduced and deferentially when on the same record.61
Notably, the Federal Circuit did so in a case where the interference involved
cancellation of issued patent claims.62 Thus, long before enactment of the
modern post-issuance review proceedings, issued patents have been reviewed,
affected, and even cancelled for lack of novelty (albeit on the limited grounds
of a competing claim of priority) in administrative proceedings in the Patent
Office, with review in federal court limited to traditional court-agency review
standards (though in recent years only if no new evidence is introduced).
B. Constitutional Challenges to AIA Post-Issuance Procedures
The expansion of Patent Office post-issuance review since the early 1980s
58

Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 124-25, 129 (1894).
In Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 290 F. 565 (1923),
the district court expressly noted that the deferential standard of Morgan v. Daniels applied
in a suit to (among other things) cancel an issued patent claim after an interference between
the issued patent and an application was resolved adverse to the issued patent claim. Id. at
570-575. The case itself involved deference to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia on direct appeal from the interference, but the court treated this deference as equivalent to that owed the Patent Office’s interference decision. Id. at 571-572.
This decision was summarily affirmed by the Third Circuit, which expressly referenced the
reliance on Morgan, 8 F.2d 41, 41 (3d Cir. 1925), and subsequently by the Supreme Court,
which did so “on the authority of,” inter alia, Morgan, 273 U.S. 670 (1927).
60 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 159-60 (1999).
61 Troy, 758 F.3d at 1328.
62 Id. at 1323-24.
59
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has generated a series of constitutional challenges to these procedures. The
Federal Circuit initially confronted these issues in the context of ex parte reexamination. In Patlex v. Mossinghoff, the Federal Circuit held that reexamination did not constitute a regulatory taking of private property without just compensation in violation of the 5th Amendment.63 It then tersely rejected the
argument that cancellation of a patent could only occur in an Article III court
using a jury pursuant to the Seventh Amendment.64 The Federal Circuit reasoned that such an argument only applied to so-called “private rights” but that
patent rights were granted by the government and primarily involved the public
interest, so therefore Congress could constitutionally assign review of the validity of issued patents to an administrative forum.65
The new AIA procedures have generated another round of constitutional
challenges to the administrative review and cancellation of issued patents. In a
series of appeals, petitions for Federal Circuit en banc review, and petitions for
writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court, patentees have contended that the AIA
post-issuance review procedures are unconstitutional under Article III and/or
the Seventh Amendment. The challenges generally contend broadly that “it is
an unconstitutional encroachment on Article III courts for the Executive to affect an issued patent in any way,”66 a contention that would apply not just to
the new AIA proceedings, but also to ex parte reexamination and the longexisting practice of resolving interferences involving issued patents in the Patent Office. In doing so, the challenges generally mask differences that make
challenges to the AIA proceedings stronger (though still likely unsuccessful)
than would be challenges to administrative invalidation in ex parte reexamination or interferences.67 The challenges do differ in the remedy they seek, with
63

Patlex v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602-03 (Fed. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Patlex].
Id. at 604-05.
65 See id.; see also Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 229 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reconfirming Patlex in face of similar challenges to ex parte reexamination).
66 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Cooper v. Lee, 137 S.Ct. 291 (2016) (No. 15-955)
[hereinafter Cooper Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Oil States Energy Servs.,
LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, (2016) (No. 16-712) [hereinafter Oil States Petition]
(“Suits to invalidate patents must be tried before a jury in an Article III forum, not in an
agency proceeding.”); Petition for Initial Hearing En Banc of Constitutional Question at 9,
Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson Am. Inc., (2017) (Nos. 2017-1517, 1518) [hereinafter
Cascades Petition] (“A patent, upon issuance, is not supposed to be subject to revocation or
cancellation by any executive agent (i.e., the Patent Office or any part of it, such as the
PTAB).”); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26-27, MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d 1284
(2016) (No. 15-1330) [hereinafter MCM Portfolio Petition] (“[W]hile other administrative
reexamination and review proceedings may also be problematic, [inter partes review] stands
alone in terms of the magnitude of the threat to property rights and the flagrancy with which
Congress chose to bypass Article III courts and juries.”) (alteration in original).
67 But see MCM Portfolio Petition, supra note 666, at 2-8 (No. 15-1330) (describing the
64
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some arguing for an end to Patent Office post-issuance review68 and some arguing that post-issuance review should become merely advisory and/or subject
to de novo review by courts.69
The constitutional challenges raise three main arguments, which are explored in more depth in Parts II and III. First, the challenges generally conflate
the idea of a “private right” for purposes of Article III with the idea of “private
property rights” for other purposes, contending that because patent rights are
private property rights they must be “private rights” for Article III purposes
and therefore allegedly cannot be assigned to administrative adjudication.70
Second, the challenges rely heavily on nineteenth century Supreme Court invention and land patent cases, in particular McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co.
v. Aultman,71 and ignore in large part the Supreme Court’s modern Article III
jurisprudence that has developed with the rise of the administrative state.72
Third, when the challenges address the modern Article III jurisprudence they
tend to focus on the Supreme Court’s statement in Stern v. Marshall that
“Congress cannot ‘withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from
its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty’” as of the enactment of the Constitution in 1789, generally ignoring that the
Supreme Court characterized this as one of the “various formulations” the
Court has identified for determining whether adjudication can be assigned to
non-Article III forums.73
In addition to these arguments, which are relevant to the Article III and Sevdifferences but only relying on them in passing).
68 See Oil States Petition, supra note 666, at 19 (No. 16-712) (“The Constitution prohibits inter parties review . . .”).
69 Cooper Petition, supra note 666, at 5 (No. 15-955); see also Cascades Petition, supra
note 57, at 14 (Nos. 2017-1517, 1518).
70 See, e.g., id. at 9(“To take away a patent after issuance invokes ‘private’ rights –
namely, fully vested property rights.”); Cooper Petition, supra note 66, at 14 (No. 15-955),
(rejecting characterization of patent rights as public rights because “patents are a property
right, complete with the most important characteristic of private ownership – the right of
exclusion”); Brief of 13 Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,, MCM
Portfolio, 812 F.3d 1284 (2016) (No. 15-1330) (rejecting characterization of patent rights as
public rights because “[t]his Court recently and repeatedly confirmed the principle that patents are private property rights that are secured under the Constitution”).
71 169 U.S. 606 (1898).
72 See, e.g., Cascades Petition, supra note 66, at 5-12 (Nos. 2017-1517, 1518); Oil
States Petition, supra note 66, at 16-19 (No. 16-712); MCM Portfolio Petition, supra note
66 (No. 15-1330), at 22-26; Cooper Petition, supra note 66 (No. 15-955), at 19-27; but see
id. at 27-34 (addressing modern Article III precedent).
73 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 488 (2011) [hereinafter Stern]; see also Cascades
Petition, supra note 57, at 11(Nos. 2017-1517, 1518); Oil States Petition, supra note 57, at
16 (No. 16-712); MCM Portfolio Petition, supra note 66, at 30 (No. 15-1330).
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enth Amendment issues and are addressed in Parts II and III, the challengers or
their amici raise a variety of arguments that are simply irrelevant to the constitutional challenges being made. First, the challengers or their amici complain
that patentees are subject to different standards of proof, presumptions, and
claim construction standards in Patent Office post-issuance proceedings than in
federal district court litigation.74 However, Article III only guarantees a decision maker outside of the executive branch with life tenure secured against salary reduction,75 and the Seventh Amendment only guarantees the right to a jury
in civil cases. Standards of proof, presumption, and claim construction standards are policy choices made by Congress, the Patent Office, and/or the courts,
without constitutional salience under Article III or the Seventh Amendment.
Second, the challengers or their amici raise policy concerns with Patent Office
post-issuance proceedings, including that they have had a negative effect on
patent rights and innovation policy.76 Again, these policy concerns do not rise
to the constitutional level and have nothing to do with Article III or the Seventh Amendment. Whether post-issuance proceedings are wise as a matter of
public policy or innovation policy is a question left to Congress.77
The Federal Circuit considered and rejected a constitutional challenge to the
AIA post-issuance review procedures in MCM Portfolio LLC v. HewlettPackard Co. The Federal Circuit first held that the principal 19th century case
(McCormick) cited by the challengers rested on statutory, not constitutional
grounds.78 It then concluded there was no Article III violation because patent
rights were public rights subject to administrative adjudication, since they were
matters of federal law, arose from an extensive federal regulatory scheme, and
depended on the expertise of the Patent Office, a specialized administrative
agency.79 Finally, the Federal Circuit found no Seventh Amendment violation
because patent rights could be validly assigned to administrative adjudication
and the Seventh Amendment does not require a jury trial in an administrative

74

See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Security People, Inc. in Support of Petitioner MCM
Portfolio, 812 F.3d 1284 (2016) (No. 15-1330); Amicus Curiae Brief of Houston Inventors
Ass’n, MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d 1284 (2016) (No. 15-1330).
75 Stern, 564 U.S. at 484.
76 See, e.g., Brief of Univ. of N.M. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, MCM
Portfolio, 812 F.3d 1284 (2016) (No. 15-1330); Brief of Amici Curiae Gary Lauder et al. in
Support of Petitioner, MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d 1284 (2016) (No. 15-1330).
77 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) [hereinafter Graham]
(“Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course, implement the
stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates
the constitutional aim.”).
78 MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d at 1289.
79 Id. at 1290.

THIS VERSION MAY CONTAIN INACCURATE OR INCOMPLETE PAGE
NUMBERS. PLEASE CONSULT THE PRINT OR ONLINE DATABASE
VERSIONS FOR THE PROPER CITATION INFORMATION.

2017]

Administrative Patent Cancellation

393

forum.80
II. ARTICLE III AND PATENT OFFICE POST-ISSUANCE REVIEW
Whether Article III permits the Patent Office to adjudicate and cancel issued
patents implicates the general Article III standards articulated by the Supreme
Court, standards that are equally applicable in the patent context.81 Unfortunately, these general Article III standards are far from a model of clarity. The
Supreme Court precedent supports three distinct (though overlapping) means
of distinguishing what can and what cannot be adjudicated in a non-Article III
forum: (1) an appellate review test that requires only sufficient Article III appellate supervision and does not restrict assignment of initial adjudication between Article III and non-Article III forums; (2) a distinction between public
rights that can be assigned to non-Article III forums and private rights that
cannot be assigned to non-Article III forums; and (3) a more open-ended balancing test that rejects categorical distinctions in favor of several nondeterminative factors that help determine the extent to which non-Article III
adjudication would threaten the interests protected by Article III.
Using any of these analytical approaches, the modern Patent Office postissuance review proceedings are likely constitutional under Article III. This
conclusion is not free from doubt – “[p]rediction is often impossible” in the
Article III context because the Supreme Court’s decisions “reflect a wildly uncertain compass.”82 In applying the Supreme Court’s analytical approaches to
Patent Office adjudication and cancellation of issued patents, the following
sections identify and evaluate the potential doubts and ambiguities in the conclusion that Article III permits Patent Office post-issuance review. These
doubts and ambiguities involve a level of nuance missing from the recent constitutional challenges to the AIA proceedings, which largely argue that all administrative adjudication of issued patents is unconstitutional based on overly
simple arguments about “private property rights” or the historical assignment
of patent adjudication to Article III courts.83 To be clear, the overwhelming
weight of the analysis suggests that Patent Office post-issuance review is well
within the constitutional limits, regardless of the merits of one or a few of the
doubts or ambiguities identified in the analysis. Although the discussion largely focuses on administrative adjudication and cancellation of issued patents as
a whole, it also notes where differences in the various post-issuance proceed80

Id. at 1292-93.
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) [hereinafter eBay]
(“These familiar principles [for injunctions] apply with equal force to disputes arising under
the Patent Act.”).
82 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III,
101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 917 (1988).
83 See supra Part I.
81
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ings (e.g., between ex parte reexamination and the AIA proceedings) could
make certain arguments weaker or stronger as applied to the different proceedings.
Before turning to the Supreme Court’s Article III precedent, it is necessary
to consider the argument – relied on heavily in the recent challenges to the
AIA proceedings – that there is no need to apply the modern Article III precedent because the Supreme Court has already held administrative adjudication
and cancellation of issued patents to be unconstitutional.84 In McCormick, the
Supreme Court concluded that an issued patent “has passed beyond the control
and jurisdiction of that [patent] office, and is not subject to be revoked or cancelled by the President, or any other officer of the Government,” and “[t]he only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for
any reason whatever, is vested in the courts of the United States, and not in the
department which issued the patent.”85 Though acknowledging that McCormick and the other land or invention patent cases upon which it relied “did not
specifically identify Article III or the Seventh Amendment,” challengers to Patent Office post-issuance review contend that these cases necessarily reflected
a constitutional, not a statutory, conclusion.86 The best support for this is
McCormick’s statement that cancellation of the patent in that case “would be in
fact an invasion of the judicial branch of the government by the executive.”87
The strong reading that McCormick held that “it is an unconstitutional encroachment on Article III courts for the Executive to affect an issued patent in
any way”88 is almost certainly incorrect. Long before McCormick, the Patent
Office had the power to adjudicate interferences involving issued patents.
Four years before McCormick, the Supreme Court held in Morgan v. Daniels
that Patent Office decisions in interferences were entitled to deference in a
subsequent proceedings between the same parties in the district courts.89 Morgan in no way excluded interferences involving issued patents, and subsequent
decisions applied it equally to such interferences.90 Thus, broad statements in
McCormick that issued patents “passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of
that [patent] office” and are “absolutely free from the future control” of the Patent Office91 are either overstatements or limited to the specific factual situation presented in that case.
84

See supra Part I.
McCormick Harvesting Mach.Co. v. C. Aultman & Co., 169 U.S. 606, 608-609
(1898) [hereinafter McCormick].
86 MCM Portfolio Petition, supra note 66, at 22-23 (No. 15-1330).
87 McCormick, 169 U.S. at 612.
88 Cooper Petition, supra note 66, at 20 (No. 15-955)
89 See supra Part I.A.
90 See supra Part I.A.
91 McCormick, 169 U.S. at 609.
85
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The better reading of McCormick is that it rests on a statutory, not constitutional, basis. Unlike Article III and/or the Seventh Amendment, McCormick
does reference the relevant statutory provision controlling the Patent Office’s
authority – in that case the reissue statute (Rev. Stat. § 4916) that allowed for
correction of inadvertent errors in patents but did not provide for “reopen[ing]
the question of the validity of the original patent.”92 In doing so, McCormick
explained that the principle that “[t]he only authority competent to set a patent
aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the
courts of the United States, and not in the department which issued the patent”
was “subject to a single qualification in the case of a patent for an invention,”
unlike “a patent for a grant of lands is [that] absolutely free from the future
control of the [administrative] officers.”93 That qualification was the reissue
procedures “embodied in Rev. Stat. § 4916.”94 If the principle articulated in
McCormick that Article III courts, not administrative agencies, had exclusive
power to adjudicate issued patents was mandated by the Constitution, it could
not be subject to qualification by statute, as McCormick said it was. Thus,
McCormick is better read as reflecting a statutory limit on the Patent Office’s
authority, with the reference to an “invasion of the judicial branch . . . by the
executive” simply reflecting the fact that administrative adjudication is constrained by the limits imposed by Congress, not just the limits imposed by the
Constitution.95
Frankly, it does not matter what the best reading of McCormick is. McCormick is at best ambiguous as to whether it rests on a constitutional or statutory
foundation. More importantly, it pre-dates the Supreme Court’s modern Article III jurisprudence. “[S]tare decisis does not prevent [the Supreme Court]
from overruling a previous decision where there has been a significant change
in, or subsequent development of, [its] constitutional law.”96 There is virtually
no chance that the Supreme Court will allow an ambiguous 19th century case
to trump evaluation of Article III issues in the patent context under the modern
Article III standards the Court has developed and applied to every other area of
92

McCormick, 169 U.S. at 609-10.
Id. at 609 (emphasis added).
94 Id. at 609-10.
95 But see Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson Am. Inc., Nos. 2017-1517, 1518, —F.3d—-, slip op. dissent at 10 (Fed Cir. May 11, 2017) (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of
initial hearing en banc) (“The cases McCormick cites in holding that an executive agency
may not cancel issued patents concern the separation of powers and similar constitutional
issues.”); Michael I. Rothwell, After MCM, A Second Look: Article I Invalidation of Issued
Patents for Intellectual Property Still Likely Unconstitutional After Stern v. Marshall, 18
N.C. J. LAW & TECH. 1, 8-18 (2017) (contending that cases cited in McCormick rested on
constitutional grounds).
96 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997).
93
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law. In fact, the focus on McCormick at the expense of the intervening Supreme Court Article III cases by those challenging the constitutionality of Patent Office post-issuance review97 is reminiscent of other efforts to adopt special rules to govern patent cases that depart from mainstream law, efforts that
the Supreme Court has consistently rejected over the past decade or so.98
A. The Doctrinal Morass of Article III
The Supreme Court itself has observed that its Article III precedent “has not
been entirely consistent”99 and “do[es] not admit of easy synthesis.”100 For
that reason, “[a]n absolute construction of Article III is not possible in this area
of ‘frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents.’”101 Commentators go even further: “[t]he Supreme Court opinions devoted to the subject of
the validity of legislative and administrative tribunals are as troubled, arcane,
confused and confusing as could be imagined.”102 This Section attempts to
unpack the doctrinal mess of the Supreme Court’s modern Article III precedent.
1. The Rejection of Article III Literalism
The relevant text of Article III is sparse, providing that “[t]he judicial Power
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts” as Congress chooses to establish, as well as that the judges of these
courts “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour” (i.e., have life tenure
absent an impeachable offense) and receive a salary that “shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”103 Article III serves two functions.
First, by providing that the “judicial Power” shall be vested in the courts, Article III serves a separation of powers function that prevents the other branches

97 See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 7 (focusing brief write-up of constitutional challenge to
AIA proceedings on the fact McCormick “appeared to speak directly on this issue” and remained good law because “we’re still working with the same United States Constitution”
without discussion of the intervening Supreme Court Article III precedent).
98 See Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413,
1416 (2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently sought to eliminate patent exceptionalism, bringing patent law in conformity with what it characterizes as general legal standards.”).
99 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 488 (2011)
100 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847 (1986) [hereinafter Schor].
101 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) [hereinafter Thomas].
102 Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L. J. 233, 239 (1990).
103 U.S. CONST. art. III § 1.
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from encroaching on the domain of the judicial branch.104 Second, Article III
protects individual liberty by promoting an independent judiciary whose job
and salary are free from influence by the political branches, increasing the
chances that judicial decisions will be impartial and free from political or popular influence.105
The one clear conclusion that can be drawn from the precedent is that Article III is not read literally. The Supreme Court has concluded that Article III
issues “cannot turn on conclusory reference to the language of Article III,”106
which on its face seems to require “that if Congress creates any adjudicative
bodies at all, it must grant them the protections of judicial independence that
are contemplated by article III.”107 The realities of the modern administrative
state – with administrative agencies assigned many adjudicative functions involving application of law to facts in ways that affects private interests108 –
“render a return to ‘article III literalism’ virtually unthinkable.”109
Nor have Congress or the Supreme Court “read the Constitution as requiring
every federal question arising under the federal law to be tried in an Art. III
court before a judge enjoying life tenure and protection against salary reduction.”110 To the contrary, “it was explicitly contemplated in the design of the
Constitution that some or all of these cases [subject to federal judicial power
under Article III] could and would continue to be adjudicated in the state
courts,” where judges lacked the Article III protections.111 Moreover, “[f]or
some 200 years, Congress has consistently acted on the premise that it has the
authority, in exercising its various substantive legislative powers,
to . . . constitute special courts, tribunals and agencies which exercise . . . the
federal judicial power” but lack Article III protections.112
The closest the Supreme Court came to embracing Article III literalism was
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co, where a plurality of four justices would have limited permissible non-Article III adjudication
to territorial courts, military courts martial, and tribunals resolving public
rights between the government and individuals arising from executive or legislative functions.113 Unsurprisingly, given the threat this approach posed to
104

Stern, 564 U.S. at 483.
Id.
106 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847 (1986).
107 Fallon, Jr., supra note 822, at 916.
108 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985).
109 Fallon, Jr., supra note 822, at 917.
110 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 583 (quoting Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389, 407
(1973)).
111 Bator, supra note 1022, at 234.
112 Id. at 235.
113 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64-70
105

THIS VERSION MAY CONTAIN INACCURATE OR INCOMPLETE PAGE
NUMBERS. PLEASE CONSULT THE PRINT OR ONLINE DATABASE
VERSIONS FOR THE PROPER CITATION INFORMATION.

398

B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:377

modern administrative adjudication, the Supreme Court disavowed the Northern Pipeline plurality in a majority opinion only three years later, expressly
holding that Northern Pipeline was limited to the facts of that case and did not
supply the governing Article III standards because it did not command a majority of the Court.114
2. Distinguishing Permissible and Impermissible Agency Adjudication
Identifying the line between when adjudication constitutionally can be assigned to non-Article III tribunals and when it cannot is exceedingly difficult.
Some of the Court’s decisions identify the relevant line as being between public rights and private rights. On this view, Congress may assign “public rights”
to administrative agencies but if a claim “is not a ‘public right’ for Article III
purposes, then Congress may not assign its adjudication to a specialized nonArticle III court lacking the essential attributes of the judicial power.”115
Although the Court has articulated “various formulations” of what constitutes a public right over the years,116 its more recent decisions have coalesced
around a fairly consistent definition. In Granfinanciera, the Court described a
public right, for cases not involving the federal government, as a statutory right
created pursuant to Congress’s Article I powers that is “closely intertwined
with a federal regulatory program Congress has power to enact” and “is so
closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate
for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.”117
Similarly, in Stern, the Court considered various formulations of “public
rights” that had been used over the years, before ultimately concluding under
current precedent that “what makes a right ‘public’ rather than private is that
the right is integrally related to particular federal government action.”118 In
particular, public rights are limited to those “in which the claim at issue derives
from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim by an ex(1982) (plurality) [hereinafter Northern Pipeline].
114 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584, 586; see also Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 488 (2011)
(“Shortly after Northern Pipeline, the Court rejected the limitation of the public rights exception to actions involving the Government as a party.”).
115 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53-54 (1989) [hereinafter Granfinanciera] (making this observation in the course of resolving a Seventh Amendment issue); see
also Stern, 564 U.S. at 488 (seeming to suggest that a claim must “fall within one of the
‘limited circumstances’ covered by the public rights exception” to be adjudicated in a nonArticle III tribunal).
116 Id.
117 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54. Granfinanciera was a Seventh Amendment case but
purported to apply the same definition of “public rights” as in the Article III precedent. Id.
at 53-54.
118 Stern, 564 U.S. at 490-91.
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pert government agency is deemed essential to a limited regulatory objective
within the agency’s authority.”119
Thus, these cases define a public right, at least when the government is not a
party, as a federal statutory right that is closely connected to a federal regulatory program assigned to an expert administrative agency with a limited regulatory objective. Stern contrasted these public rights with state common law
claims, which were private rights because they did not result from a federal
regulatory regime, were not dependent on federal law, did not exist by the
grace of Congress, were not historically capable of resolution just by the other
branches, and did not arise in a particularized area of law requiring an expert
administrative agency.120 This articulation of the public verse private rights
distinction provides a fairly clear framework for analyzing Article III issues,
even if not fully determinate in any particular case.
However, another strand of precedent complicates matters. In Schor, the
Supreme Court expressly stated that its decisions “rejected any attempt to
make determinative for Article III purposes the distinction between public
rights and private rights.”121 In fact, in Crowell and Schor, the Court expressly
characterized the rights in question as private rights but nonetheless found adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal permissible.122 This line of cases rejects
“formalistic and unbending rules,” instead applying a balance test that
“weigh[s] a number of factors, none of which has been deemed determinative,
with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action will have on the
constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.”123 These factors include “the extent to which the ‘essential attributes of judicial power are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the nonArticle III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements

119

Id.
Id. at 492-93.
121 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986) .
122 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) [hereinafter Crowell] (upholding agency
adjudication despite characterizing the right in question as a “private right”); Schor, 478
U.S. at 853 (permitting agency adjudication even though “[t]he counterclaim asserted in this
litigation is a ‘private’ right for which state law provides the rule of decision”); see also
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589 (upholding agency adjudication of a right described as “not a purely ‘private’ right, but bears many of the characteristics of a ‘public’ right”).
123 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851; see also Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587 (noting that “practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article III” and looking to “[t]he extent of judicial review afforded by the legislation,” “the origin of the right at issue,” and “the concerns guiding the selection by
Congress of a particular method for resolving disputes”).
120
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of Article III.”124 The Court also has given significant weight to party consent
to non-Article III adjudication125 and the opportunity for Article III appellate
review.126
The relationship between these two strands of Article III precedent is unclear. Crowell, Schor, and Thomas all remain good law, having neither been
overruled nor abrogated by Granfinanciera, Stern, or other subsequent Supreme Court precedent. It may be that the two lines of precedent simply characterize the same test differently. Stern appeared to treat the balancing test
from the Schor and Thomas line of precedent as a means for drawing the public/private rights distinction, describing Schor and Thomas as cases involving
rights sufficiently intertwined with a federal regulatory program to constitute
public rights capable of non-Article III adjudication.127 Likewise, Granfinanciera expressly noted that cases like Crowell permitting non-Article III adjudication of what those cases characterized as “private rights” under then-existing
precedent actually involved “public rights” under the modern Supreme Court
understanding.128 At the same time, it is not clear that these two lines of precedent are completely free of substantive differences, as explored in more detail
in the sections that follow.
Alternatively, there may be a difference in the Article III standards articulated in Stern/Granfinanciera and Crowell/Thomas/Schor but the two lines might
be consistent because they apply in different settings. The former line of cases
arose in the context of bankruptcy courts, which are legislative courts that look
and act more like Article III courts. The latter line of cases arose in the context
of specialized administrative agencies with specialized expertise in a limited
area that adjudicated disputes as only part of their particular regulatory objective. Perhaps the more restrictive public/private rights distinction applies to
legislative courts and the more permissive balancing test applies to administrative agencies. This differentiation would be consistent with the general sense
that legislative courts are more troubling than administrative agencies because

124

Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
Id. at 849-850, 855 (finding individual liberty concerns satisfied and “separation of
powers concerns . . . diminished” where the decision to invoke this forum is left entirely to
the parties”).
126 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 591 (noting that Crowell upheld the statutory scheme under Article III even though it “concern[ed] obligations among private parties” because “Crowell
concluded that the judicial review afforded by the statute, including review of matters of
law, provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this class of cases.”).
127 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 491 (2011); see also Jaime Dodge, Reconceptualizing Non-Article III Tribunals, 99 MINN. L. REV. 905, 915 (2015) (interpreting Stern as clarifying that the balancing test determines whether a right is public or private for Article III
purposes).
128 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 55 n.10 (1989).
125
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they “exist solely or primarily for the purpose of adjudication” and therefore
more closely resemble Article III courts but without Article III protections.129
The Supreme Court in Stern explicitly noted that the bankruptcy court at issue
in that case was “so markedly distinct from the agency cases discussing the
public rights exception in the context of such a [substantive regulatory] regime;
however, we do not in this opinion express any view on how the doctrine
might apply in that different context.”130
For purposes of this Article, there is no need to definitively resolve the relationship between the public/private rights test for Article III adjudication and
the broader balancing test for Article III adjudication. Under either, Patent Office post-issuance review proceedings are likely constitutional, as explained in
the following sections. This is hardly surprising. “[T]he overwhelming weight
of judicial authority has, over a century and a half, held virtually all of th[e]
institutional development [of non-Article III adjudication] to be constitutional.”131 In particular, “the Court has routinely approved of agency adjudication,
while frequently striking down legislative courts.”132
B. The Potential Sufficiency of Article III Appellate Review
There may not even be a need to determine whether Congress could provide
for non-Article III adjudication and cancellation of issued patents, given that
Congress has provided Article III adjudication in this context, albeit in appellate rather than initial form. Professor Richard Fallon has proposed that “adequately searching appellate review of the judgments of legislative courts and
administrative agencies is both necessary and sufficient to satisfy the requirements of article III.”133 Although Professor Fallon focused on a normative
claim of what Article III should require, not a descriptive claim of what Article
III precedent does require, his theory was rooted in the Supreme Court’s Article III cases134 and has proven to have significant descriptive power.
The constitutional sufficiency of Article III appellate review is based in the
text of Article III itself. Article III requires that the judicial power of the United States be exercised by judges with Article III protection but
it does not tell us in terms what counts as its exercise, nor
what participation in its exercise is required in order to constitute the exercise of the judicial power by the courts vested
with the power. . . . It leaves open the possibility that we have
129

Dodge, supra note 127, at 918-19 (2015).
Stern, 564 U.S. at 490-91.
131 Bator, supra note 102, at 918.
132 Dodge, supra note 127, at 905 (2015).
133 Fallon, Jr., supra note 82, at 918.
134 Id. at 924 (basing his theory, in particular, on Crowell’s holding that “an administrative tribunal may make findings of fact and render an initial decision of legal and constitutional questions, as long as there is adequate review in a constitutional court”).
130
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satisfied the concept of the exercise of the judicial power of
the United States by the article III courts if there is sufficient
participation in its exercise by those courts whether as a matter of original or appellate jurisdiction.135
In fact, Congress was not required to create lower federal courts and could
instead have relied on state courts (and to a large extent did in the 19th century), which lack Article III protections, for initial adjudication of matters falling
within the federal judicial power, subject only to appellate review by the Article III Supreme Court.136
The sufficiency of Article III appellate review is also consistent with the
purposes of Article III because it “can provide an effective check against politically influenced adjudication, arbitrary and self-interested decision-making,
and other evils that the separation of powers was designed to prevent” and “can
help ensure fairness to litigants and can be sufficiently searching to preserve
judicial integrity.”137
Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of the textual and policy support, the Supreme Court has indicated that Article III appellate review can, at least significantly, satisfy the constitutional demands of Article III. In Crowell, which the
Court itself characterized as involving private rights, the Court held that “there
is no requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact” must be made by Article III judges.138
Even though agency factual findings were deemed final, “the reservation of
full authority to the court to deal with matters of law provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this class of cases,” as long as jurisdictional and constitutional facts were also subject to judicial review.139 Similarly, in Thomas, where judicial review was only for fraud, misrepresentation, or
other misconduct,140 the Court “conclude[d] that, in the circumstances, the review afforded preserves the ‘appropriate exercise of the judicial function,’”
even though the Court described the right at issue as having characteristics of
both a private right and a public right.141
Notably, these cases involved adjudication by an administrative agency, like
135

Bator, supra note 102, at 265.
Id. at 234.
137 Fallon, Jr., supra note 82, at 947.
138
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51, (1932).
139 Id. at 45-46, 51, 54, 61-62; see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods.
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 591 (1985) (noting that Crowell upheld the statutory scheme under Article III even though it “concern[ed] obligations among private parties” because “Crowell
concluded that the judicial review afforded by the statute, including review of matters of
law, provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this class of cases”).
140 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 573-74.
141 Id. at 573-74, 592.
136
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the Patent Office, whereas the cases where the Court expressed doubts about
the sufficiency of Article III appellate review involved legislative courts,
namely bankruptcy courts.142 Article III scholars therefore have concluded that
“[w]ith respect to federal agency adjudication of federal law . . . the appellate
review model has remarkable explanatory power.”143 On this view, direct Article III appellate review of administrative adjudication by itself is constitutionally sufficient, even for adjudication of private rights and even if the review is deferential.144
Each of the Patent Office post-issuance review proceedings provide for direct appellate review in the Federal Circuit, an Article III court, pursuant to
typical standards of administrative judicial review: substantial evidence for
questions of fact and de novo for constitutional issues and questions of law.145
Article III appellate review in the patent context is therefore more searching
than the appellate review found sufficient in Crowell and Thomas. It is also
consistent with the mainstream of judicial review of administrative action and
therefore would be sufficient, by itself, under the appellate review theory to
satisfy the constitutional requirements of Article III.146
This is not to say that the current scope of judicial review of Patent Office
post-issuance proceedings is the constitutional minimum – again, it is more
searching than that upheld in Crowell and Thomas. For example, even if the
Federal Circuit must now give Chevron deference to Patent Office legal determinations in some AIA matters,147 the Article III appellate review would still
be within the mainstream of administrative review, which generally includes
Chevron deference, and therefore sufficient under the appellate review theory.148 On the other hand, under the appellate review theory, questions of constitutional rights or whether Patent Office exceeded statutory authority, even

142 Mila Sohoni, Agency Adjudication and Judicial Nondelegation: An Article III Canon,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1569, 1583 (2013).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1572, 1593-94.
145 See Part I.A.1, supra. There is a narrow exception, as parties that lack Article III
standing are permitted to petition for post-issuance review but then cannot appeal an adverse
decision to the Federal Circuit. Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 753 F.3d 1258, 1262-63 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
146 Sohoni, supra note 142, at 1581-84 (suggesting typical standards of judicial review
of administrative action are sufficient for Article III purposes under current doctrine but
questioning, to some extent, this outcome); see also Fallon, Jr., supra note 82, at 975-91
(concluding that similar standards of review satisfy the demands of Article III).
147 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016).
148 Fallon, Jr., supra note 82, at 983-86; Sohoni, supra note 142, at 1581-84; see also
CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-2 (1986) (suggesting that “the traditional agency model”
of administrative adjudication is constitutionally permitted under Article III).
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those that arise at the initiation stage of post-issuance review, should be reviewable by the Federal Circuit on appeal from the PTAB’s final decision, despite the fact that the AIA prohibits appellate review of the routine aspects of
the Patent Office’s initiation decision, i.e., the application of the standard for
post-issuance review to the facts of the specific case.149 The Supreme Court
suggested as much in Cuozzo v. Lee, noting that nothing in the AIA prohibited
such review.150
C. Patents As Statutorily Created Public Rights Intertwined With a Federal
Regulatory Scheme?
Even if Article III appellate review alone is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III, administrative review and cancellation of issued patents involves “public rights” within the meaning of the modern Supreme
Court case law. In particular, patent rights satisfy each of the elements that the
Supreme Court has looked to in characterizing rights as public rights: (1) a
federal statutory right that is (2) closely connected to a federal regulatory program assigned to (3) an expert administrative agency with a limited regulatory
objective. Because patent rights constitute “public rights” within the meaning
of the Supreme Court’s Article III precedent, they constitutionally can be adjudicated in a non-Article III forum, like the PTAB.
1. Patents Are Federal Statutory Rights
The Supreme Court Article III cases repeatedly contrast rights that exist
solely because of federal statute with rights existing as a result of state common law, with the former generally susceptible to agency adjudication.151 For
example, in Granfinanciera, the Supreme Court emphasized that “a statutory
right . . . closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program Congress has
power to enact” could be assigned to agency adjudication, whereas traditional
common law tort, contract, and property actions were less susceptible to agency adjudication.152 Likewise, in Stern, the Court held that the claim before it
could not be adjudicated in a legislative court because it was “one under state
common law between two private parties,” not a [claim] that “can be pursued
only by grace of the other branches” or “depend[s] on the will of congress.”153

149

Cuozzo 136 S. Ct. at 2139-42.
Id. at 2141-42.
151 Dodge, supra note 127, at 927 (“The existing doctrine now permits the transfer of
claims between private parties to non-Article III tribunals only where that claim is created
by federal statute or intertwined with a federal statutory right.”).
152 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989).
153
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 504 (2011) (quoting Den Ex Dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 18 How. 272, 284 (1856)).
150
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Common law claims are “claim[s] of the kind assumed to be at the ‘core’ of
matters normally reserved to Article III courts.”154 To be clear, state common
law rights are susceptible to agency adjudication, albeit in more limited circumstances.155 By contrast, “when Congress creates a substantive federal
right, it possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which that
right may be adjudicated,” including “provid[ing] that persons seeking to vindicate that right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform
the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right.”156 This power is “incidental to Congress’ power to define the right that it has created.”157
Patent rights are rights created by federal statute that exist solely by the
grace of Congress. Inventors have no inherent or “natural” right to exclusive
control of their inventions, nor is there any inherent or natural set of rights for
when a patent must issue or what rights it must provide.158 Instead, patent
rights are creatures of federal statute – the Patent Act – subject to the terms and
conditions set by Congress.159 Although patent rights have a Constitutional
basis in Article I, Section 8, they are not constitutional rights. The Constitution is “permissive” with regards to patent rights, leaving it up to Congress to
decide whether and to what extent to grant patent rights.160 The Constitution
imposes only a ceiling on Congress’s power to issue patent rights based on
“the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose,” but does not im154

CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986).
Id. at 853-854 (holding that “there is no reason inherent in separation of powers principles to accord the state law character of a claim talismanic power in Article III inquiries”
but that “where private, common law rights are at stake, our examination of the congressional attempt to control the manner in which those rights are adjudicated has been searching.”).
156 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 80, 83
(1982) (plurality); see also Fallon, Jr., supra note 82, at 930 (interpreting Supreme Court
precedent as holding that “when Congress has created a substantive right, it should enjoy
considerable flexibility to prescribe the mode of enforcement.”).
157 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 83.
158 See Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 99-102 (1995).
159 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Within the scope
established by the Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and tests for patentability.”); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 985 (2007)
(“[T]he Court held that the Constitution did not secure a preexisting natural right to copyright or patent, and that such rights were defined and secured only by the statutes that the
Constitution empowered Congress to enact.” (referring to Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591,
657-58 (1834)).
160 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972); Walterscheid,
supra note 158, at 99.
155
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pose a floor creating or requiring patent rights.161
Because Congress has the power to “select[] the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim” and “set out conditions and tests
for patentability,” patent rights result from “the statutory scheme of the Congress.”162 Under the Article III precedent, “the method of rights enforcement
for a particular federal statutory regime is a decision for Congress to make in
its creation of the new right . . . [I]t may keep this authority, vest the execution
in the executive branch or an agency, or structure the right as one susceptible
to judicial enforcement.”163 This power is inherent in Congress’s power to define the scope of the right it has created.164 Thus, the fact that Congress created patent rights pursuant to its Article I power strongly supports the conclusion
that it can apportion adjudication of those rights to an administrative agency
like the Patent Office.
The constitutional challenges to post-issuance review rely heavily on two
flawed arguments regarding the nature of patent rights. First, the constitutional challenges tend to equate the private property status of patent rights with
“private rights” within the meaning of the Article III precedent.165 Simply because something could be described as private property for other purposes does
not make it a private right incapable of agency adjudication under Article III.
A few cases are particularly instructive in this regard. In Thomas, a federal
statute created what was essentially a data exclusivity right by which pesticide
manufacturers who submitted required data to the EPA were granted a “limited
proprietary interest” in the submitted data and entitled to compensation if that
data was used in reviewing the registration applications of follow-on pesticide
manufacturers.166 The manufacturer’s right to compensation for use of its data
by the follow-on manufacturer reasonably could be described as a private
property interest.167 Yet, the Supreme Court held that “the right created by
FIFRA is not a purely ‘private’ right, but bears many of the characteristics of a
‘public’ right” and was therefore subject to agency adjudication.168
161

Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
Id.
163 Dodge, supra note 127, at 932.
164 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83
(1982) (plurality).
165
See Part I.B, supra.
166 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571-75(1985).
167 See id. at 584-585 (rejecting the argument that the right to compensation was state
law property interest, concluding instead that the right was federal in nature); see also Erika
Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 104 (2016) (noting
that data exclusivity is normally described as a type of intellectual property, though offering
a different characterization).
168 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589.
162
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The Supreme Court’s characterization of its decision in Block v. Hirsh is
perhaps even clearer that private property rights can be public rights subject to
agency adjudication. Block involved the prototypical private property right –
an owner’s right to exclusive possession of real property. A landowner sought
to recover possession of property after a tenant, relying on a District of Columbia statute, refused to vacate the property at the end of his lease.169 Despite
the private property interests at stake, the Supreme Court upheld the creation of
an administrative Commission to determine both the right of possession and
the appropriate amount of rent.170 Although Block itself did not expressly reference Article III, the Court subsequently described it “as an example of ‘public rights’” subject to agency adjudication.171 Indeed, even in the bankruptcy
context, where the Supreme Court has been most willing to strike down nonArticle III adjudication, the Court is clear that claims involving private property interests are capable of adjudication in non-Article III tribunals, including
creditors’ claims against the bankrupt estate for debts owed and even claims by
the estate against the creditors to recover preferential transfers (i.e., money
paid by the bankrupt prior to entering bankruptcy).172
The relevant Article III question is not whether a claim involves private
property rights but rather what the source of those rights is. State common law
property rights often will not be subject to non-Article III adjudication.173 But
when federal law creates a right, it generally can be adjudicated in a nonArticle III tribunal, even if the right can be characterized as a private property
interest.174 In essence, when Congress creates the right, it can determine what
bundle of sticks to confer, including substantial leeway as to whether to include Article III adjudication within the right.175
This is particularly clear with regard to patent rights. Patent rights are private property only because of a federal statute, 35 U.S.C. § 261. It is “the fed-

169

Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153 (1921).
Id. at 157-158.
171 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589.
172 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 495-96 (2011).
173 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51 (1989) (suggesting that “[w]holly
private tort, contract, and property cases” that do not involve public rights are not subject to
administrative adjudication).
174 Stern, 564 U.S. at 498 (describing prior bankruptcy cases where non-Article III adjudication was upheld as involving “a right of recovery created by federal bankruptcy law”);
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 583-85 (finding that right to compensation for data usage created by
federal law and Congress was therefore permitted to assign adjudication to an agency).
175 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83
(1982) (plurality) (noting that Congress’ ability to dictate administrative adjudication of
rights created by federal statute is “incidental to Congress’ power to define the right that it
has created.”).
170
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eral patent scheme [that] creates a limited opportunity to obtain a property
right in an idea.”176 Section 261 explicitly states that “[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”177
Thus, the other provisions of Title 35 limit the scope of the private property
right created by the statute, i.e., determine the bundle of sticks provided.178
Post-AIA, the property rights provided by a patent are limited by the possibility of cancellation in the various Patent Office post-issuance proceedings.
Even for patents issued before the AIA, the property right was limited by the
possibility of administrative cancellation in reexamination or interference proceedings. In sum, the “private property” nature of patent rights does not affect
their ability to be adjudicated in non-Article III tribunals, especially (though
not exclusively) because patents are expressly deemed property subject to the
possibility of administrative cancellation.
Second, challengers to the constitutionality of post-issuance proceedings
contend that patent validity was resolved in courts of law in 1789, attempting
to bring it into the category of “traditional actions at common law” that Stern
and other cases have suggested are the least susceptible to non-Article III adjudication.179 As an initial matter, the Supreme Court in Schor made clear that
common law claims can be subject to administrative adjudication, at least in
some circumstances.180 Moreover, there is uncertainty as to whether and to
what extent a right existed in England at the time of the founding to have patent validity resolved by a court at law.181 In particular, revocation or cancellation of patent rights occurred before the Privy Council, the closest equivalent
to the modern administrative agency, into at least the late 1700s, with the Privy
Council apparently having, but rarely exercising, this power even into the mid1800s.182 Similarly, during the Articles of Confederation, “at least in some
states where the issue arose it seems to have been assumed that patents were
revocable. The presumption there was that what the legislature’s discretion
could award in the patent grant could also be taken away by the same pow-

176 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149 (1989) [hereinafter Bonito Boats].
177 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (emphasis added).
178 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (noting that property
rights created by statute were limited by other provisions of statute, including provision that
injunctions only “may” issue subject to normal requirements of equity).
179 See supra Part I.B; see also Stern, 564 U.S. at 483-84. .
180 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-54 (1986).
181 Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673,
1687, 1691 (2013).
182 Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual Property 6061, n.129 (June 2005) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Harvard Law School).
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er.”183
In any event, what matters for Article III purposes is whether the claim was
created by the common law, as opposed to a federal statute, not whether the
claim was adjudicated in courts at law in 1789.184 When Stern suggested that
Article III adjudication was required “[w]hen a suit is made of the stuff of the
traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789,”
it required not just that the claim be one that was tried in courts at law, i.e.,
“the courts at Westminster,” but also that the claim be a “traditional action at
common law.”185
To the extent the constitutional challenges attempt to bring patent rights
within this statement in Stern by contending that patent rights “have clear
common law antecedents” or “common law foundations,”186 they are flatly
wrong. “[I]t has never been pretended, by any one, either in this country or in
England, that an inventor has a perpetual right, at common law, to sell the
thing invented.”187 Even Professor Adam Mossoff, one of the strongest advocates of patents as property rights, described as “false” any argument that “patents were secured at common law” and instead acknowledged that patents
rights are “secured by federal statute.”188 That is what matters for purposes of
Article III. The fact that patent validity might have been resolved in courts at
law in England in 1789 is of no significance to the Article III question.
2. Patent Rights Are Closely Connected to a Federal Regulatory Program
Although we often do not think of the patent system as a federal regulatory
program because it pre-dates the modern administrative state, the Supreme
Court has characterized it as exactly that. According to the Court, “[t]he patent
statute’s careful balance between public right and private monopoly to promote
certain creative activity is a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”189
Patent rights have regulatory effects – they determine what businesses and
individuals can and cannot do in terms of making, using, selling, offering to
sell, and importing products and processes covered by patent rights.190 Like
183

Id. at 110.
Stern, 564 U.S. at 492-95. (repeatedly emphasizing that the claim was a common law
right, not that the claim was tried in the courts at law, in finding it not susceptible to nonArticle III adjudication).
185 Id. at 484.
186 MCM Portfolio Petition, supra note 66, at 23, 26 (No. 15-1330).
187 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661 (1834).
188 Mossoff, supra note 158, at 981.
189 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167 (1989).
190 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 847 (2015) (Thomas, J., dis184
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other federal regulatory programs, patent rights regulate and restrict behavior
for a public purpose pursuant to Congress’s Article I powers. The United
States Constitution expressly treats patents as public policy tools that Congress
may issue but only when, and to the extent, they promote the progress of technological innovation.191 The Supreme “[C]ourt has consistently held that the
primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for
the owners of patents but is to ‘promote the progress of science and useful
arts.”192 Patents reflect a trade-off between social benefits and social costs: “a
balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the
‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.”193
The Constitution leaves it to Congress to design the patent regulatory
scheme, i.e., to decide what terms and conditions are necessary to insure that
patents will promote technological innovation.194 Congress, in turn, “set forth
the prerequisites for issuance of a patent” and “charged the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) with the task of examining patent applications” to evaluate whether these prerequisites are satisfied. The result is a
“pervasive” federal regulatory scheme195 under the auspices of a federal administrative agency, fairly typical of the modern administrative state.
The validity of patent rights is “integrally related” to this federal regulatory
scheme. Patent rights are the means of implementing the regulatory objective
of promoting innovation. And the validity of an issued patent raises the exact
same questions raised in the agency’s initial examination of a patent – a validity challenge is an “attempt to prove that the patent never should have issued in
the first place.”196 Ultimately, validity challenges “help protect the public’s
‘paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept within their
legitimate scope.’”197 and therefore are closely connected to the core regulatory
senting).
191 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Nor may [Congress] enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social
benefit gained thereby.”).
192 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917).
193 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
194 Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (“Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress
may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which
in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.”); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016) (describing the patent system as reflecting “Congress’ regulatory design”).
195 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 167.
196 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242-43 (2011) [hereinafter
Microsoft].
197 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144.
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objective of the patent system: balancing the need to promote innovation with
the need to preserve competition.
To be fair, there is some amount of ambiguity in the conclusion that patent
rights are closely connected to a federal regulatory scheme for purposes of
“public rights” within the meaning of the Article III cases, at least more so than
other aspects of the Article III analysis. Two reasonable, though ultimately
unconvincing arguments, warrant further discussion.
First, one could question whether the patent system, even if regulatory in
nature, is the type of federal regulatory scheme that the Supreme Court had in
mind in discussing the “public rights” exception to Article III.198 The Patent
Office lacks general substantive rulemaking authority199 and has no authority
over infringement or other enforcement responsibilities.200 Nor does it have
significant discretion to make policy choices about what inventions warrant
patent protection and what inventions do not. Many of the relevant policy
choices have been made by Congress and are reflected in the various statutory
requirements of patentability.201 The Federal Circuit has primary responsibility for filling the significant gaps that remain from Congress’s frequent choice
of broad and vague language.202 The Patent Office’s role is limited to the fairly routine task of evaluating specific patent applications or issued patents to
determine whether they meet these statutory requirements.203 In this way, the
patent system differs from “[t]he paradigm of decision making in the modern
administrative state” in which agencies have primary responsibility for regulatory policy.204 Perhaps, then, the Patent Office is not the type of administrative
agency “allocat[ing] costs and benefits” pursuant to a “complex regulatory
scheme” that the Supreme Court envisioned in defining “public rights” for Ar-

198 Cf. In re Clay, 35 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1994) (“We do not see bankruptcy law as a
‘public regulatory scheme’ akin to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
discussed in Thomas. It provides process, procedures, and a forum, but does not (as would a
public regulatory scheme) implement policy choices beyond the confines of cases brought to
it.”).
199 Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51,
76-77 (2010).
200 Greg Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 549, 564-66 (2017).
201
See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146-151.
202 See Nard, supra note 199, at 75.
203 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011); see also Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1755 (2011).
204 Id. at 1754-55; see also Fallon, Jr., supra note 82, at 925 (“‘Regulatory agencies’ - so
called because their activities restrict private conduct - typically possess authority to lay
down rules, to determine whether private parties have violated the law, and to prescribe
sanctions.”).
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ticle III purposes.205
However, the Supreme Court has not suggested that an agency’s power or
role beyond adjudication is relevant to the constitutionality of its adjudicative
functions.206 To the contrary, agencies that simply evaluate individual claims
for compliance with statutory requirements are one of the traditional categories
of administrative adjudication permissible under Article III, at least in cases in
which the individual has a claim for federal benefits against the government.207
Even in cases between private parties, the Supreme Court has upheld administrative adjudication by agencies with powers of similar or lesser scope to the
Patent Office. For example, in Crowell, the Supreme Court sustained administrative resolution of maritime workers’ compensation claims by an agency
whose only apparent function was to resolve such claims by determining primarily factual questions about the nature and circumstances of the injury and
the proper amount of compensation.208
Thus, the key question is not the relevant agency’s overall power within the
regulatory scheme but rather whether there is a comprehensive federal regulatory program that was within Congress’s Article I powers to create.209 If so,
the decision how to apportion power – including the power to adjudicate disputes arising out of the regulatory scheme – between Congress, the agency,
and the federal courts is left to Congress.210 The Supreme Court is clear that
the patent system constitutes a “pervasive” and comprehensive federal regulatory scheme created pursuant to Congress’s Article I powers.211
Second, one might focus specifically on post-issuance review proceedings
before the PTAB and contend that they do not serve a regulatory purpose but
205 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985); see also CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836 (1986). (describing the agency in that case as having
“sweeping authority to implement” the relevant statute).
206 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851-57 (focusing on “the CFTC’s adjudicatory powers” in analyzing Article III issue); Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589-93 (focusing on “FIFRA arbitration scheme”
in analyzing Article III issues).
207 See Dodge, supra note 127, at 913 (2015) (noting that “administrative determination
of amounts due to or from the government; for example, customs duties and veterans benefits” has existed since the earliest days of the United States).
208 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 36-47 (1932).
209 See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (emphasizing Congress’s “Article I powers” in upholding
administrative adjudication); Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589 (focusing on Congress’s power under
Article I).
210 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (cautioning against applying Article III precedent in a way
that would “unduly constrict Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant
to its Article I powers”); Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589 (describing Article as “not so inflexible”
as to undermine Congress’s power under Article I to permit administrative adjudication of
the allocation of costs and benefits in a federal regulatory scheme).
211 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146, 167 (1989).
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rather function as a litigation substitute.212 The AIA’s post-issuance review
procedures have trial-like features, including a live hearing, opportunities for
discovery, and the ability to present factual and expert evidence.213 But this
has little, if any, constitutional salience under Article III. Formal agency adjudications, which often include trial-like procedures, are a well-recognized form
of agency regulatory activity.214 The Supreme Court has upheld administrative
adjudications under Article III that utilized trial-like procedures similar to
those used by the PTAB.215
Nor is it of particular significance under Article III if Congress created postissuance review as a “surrogate for court proceedings”216 or “avowedly sought
to avoid civil litigation over patent validity.”217 The Supreme Court, while
“acknowledg[ing] the importance of judicial independence,” has “accepted as
legitimate the desire of Congress to provide an expert and efficient alternative
to the federal courts for the resolution of [certain types of] disputes.”218 Indeed, even if challengers are correct that Congress sought to “facilitate patent
validity challenges by shifting them from a judicial forum into an administrative one,”219 this would not be abnormal, as Congress frequently has assigned
adjudicative functions to administrative agencies exactly because it sought a
different outcome than what would occur in ordinary civil litigation.220 Thus,
212

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016) (describing party’s
argument but expressing skepticism that Congress really intended post-issuance review as
just a replacement for district court litigation).
213 Id. at 2143.
214 Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for
the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1989-94 (2013).
215 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 43 (1932) (noting that the administrative
adjudication upheld in that case involved “a hearing, upon notice, at which the claimant and
the employer may present evidence,” as well as authority for the decision maker to “issue
subpoenas, administer oaths, compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, [and] the
production of documents or other evidence or the taking of depositions”).
216 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143 (describing party’s argument but expressing skepticism
that Congress really intended post-issuance review as just a replacement for district court
litigation).
217 MCM Portfolio Petition, supra note 66, at 27 (No. 15-1330).
218 James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of
the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 663 (2004) (describing Schor); Noriega-Perez v.
United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Noriega-Perez] (upholding
administrative adjudication that Congress intended as substitute for inefficient Article III
adjudication because “efficiency and reduced expense are proper purposes for committing
matters for adjudication by administrative tribunals.”).
219 MCM Portfolio Petition, supra note 66, at 13-14 (No. 15-1330).
220 Bator, supra note 102, at 238 (“And some of these assignments of jurisdiction were,
as in the case of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), specifically designed to en-
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concluding that Congress’s desire to replace, or achieve different outcomes
than, traditional civil litigation renders non-Article III adjudication improper
would threaten not just post-issuance review in the Patent Office but also large
swaths of the modern administrative state.221
In any event, in Cuozzo v. Lee, the Supreme Court already considered and
rejected an argument that post-issuance review is just a substitute for civil litigation. Despite some trial-like procedures, “in other significant respects, inter
partes review is less like a judicial proceeding and more like a specialized
agency proceeding,” including relaxed standing requirements, the ability of the
agency to proceed ex parte if the adverse party settles or otherwise drops out,
and different burdens of proof.222 “Most importantly, these features, as well as
inter partes review’s predecessors, indicate that the purpose of the proceeding”
is to “offer[] a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent.”223 In
contrast to district court litigation, post-issuance review proceedings seek to
protect the public from unwarranted patent rights, rather than just “helping resolve concrete patent-related disputes among parties.”224 The Court’s decision
in Cuozzo confirms that post-issuance review proceedings are closely connected to the Patent Office’s primary regulatory function of evaluating and issuing
patents.
3. The Patent Office Is an Expert Administrative Agency with a Limited
Regulatory Objective
The final factor Supreme Court cases use to define a public right (at least in
cases in which the government is not a party) is whether adjudication is by an
expert administrative agency with a limited regulatory objective.225 The Patent
Office fairly easily satisfies both aspects of this requirement.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the expertise of the Patent
Office. The Patent Office’s expertise comes in two forms: scientific or technical expertise226 and “special expertise in evaluating patent applications.”227
trust a novel and reformist statutory mission to an agency that was politically and psychologically ‘committed’ to the task and was free of the traditional (and ‘conservative’) perspectives of the ordinary ‘generalist’ courts.”).
221 Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding administrative adjudication where Congress was motivated by inefficiency of Article III counterpart because “[f]ew, if any, non-Article III courts would survive judicial scrutiny if efficiency became an impermissible reason for their establishment”).
222 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2135 (2016).
223 Id. at 2144.
224 Id.
225 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 490-91 (2011).
226 See Cuozzo, at 2137-38 (2016); Reilly, supra note 200, at 564-565.
227 Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700 (2012). Again, evaluating the validity of an
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Although the judges of the PTAB are distinct from the patent examiners that
evaluate applications initially, their expertise is similar. “[T]he PTAB has expertise to cope with the technical aspects of its cases: it is composed entirely of
patent and technology experts and there is an effort to staff each three-member
panel with at least one judge who has specific familiarity with the field of the
patented invention.”228 An additional job requirement for PTAB judges is a
“‘demonstrated ability to litigate or draft decisions around patentability,’” with
most having significant experience as patent attorneys and a significant number being former patent examiners.229 In fact, because PTAB judges are both
technically and legally trained, they arguably have greater expertise than technically- but not legally trained patent examiners to resolve the hybrid technical-legal issues that pervade patent law.230
Unlike the state law counterclaims at issue in Stern, “[t]he ‘experts’ in the
federal system at resolving” patent validity questions are not the Article III
courts, but rather the Patent Office, including the PTAB judges specifically.
Most Article III judges, including a majority of Federal Circuit judges, lack
any scientific or technical training.231 Most have no background in patent law
(including many of the Federal Circuit judges before joining the bench232) or
experience evaluating the patentability of patent applications or validity of issued patents, other than whatever patent cases they have handled on the federal
bench.233 Indeed, extensive concern has been raised as to whether Article III
district judges understand both complex and arcane patent law doctrine and the

issued patent is essentially the same task as evaluating the patentability of a patent application. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242-43 (2011).
228 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 240 (2015).
229 Jennifer R. Bush, Administrative Patent Judges: Not Your Typical Federal Judge,
FENWICK
&
WEST
LLP
(2014),
https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Administrative_Patent_Judges.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48XH-ZYSH]; see also Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2137 (“It creates within the
Patent Office a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) composed of administrative patent
judges, who are patent lawyers and former patent examiners, among others.”).
230 Reilly, supra note 200, at 564-66.
231 Id. at 565 n.103.
232 John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 666 (2009) (“Since the
[Federal] Circuit’s formation, only a minority of its judges have had notably substantial preFederal Circuit involvement with patent law.”).
233 Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 16 (2010) (noting that
although “some districts have developed significant expertise in patent cases . . . the ‘average’ district judge receives only a few patent cases per year and handles a patent trial only
once every seven years).
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underlying technology sufficiently well to adjudicate patent disputes.234
Finally, PTAB post-issuance review serves a limited regulatory objective.
Unlike the bankruptcy courts in Stern, which had “substantive jurisdiction
reaching any area of the corpus juris,” the PTAB post-issuance review proceedings are “limited to a ‘particularized area of the law,’ as in Crowell,
Thomas, and Schor.”235 The post-issuance review proceedings only decide patent law issues and not even all patent issues. They are limited to patent validity (and sometimes only some validity issues) and do not consider questions of
infringement, remedies, or other enforcement issues. “In such circumstances,
the magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial Branch can only be termed de
minimis.”236 In fact, because the PTAB’s role is limited to taking “a second
look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent” right created by federal
law,237 the intrusion on Article III courts is significantly less than in Schor,
where the Supreme Court upheld agency adjudication of even common law
counterclaims as incidental to its adjudication of federally-created claims.238
D. Patents As Private Rights Subject to Non-Article III Adjudication Based on
a Balancing of the Competing Factors?
As explained above, it is unclear if the balancing test described in Thomas
and Schor is a means for determining the permissibility of administrative adjudication under Article III that is distinct from and independent of the public/
private rights distinction or whether it is simply a way of distinguishing between public and private rights.239 If the latter, then the balancing test is refined by, and subsumed into, the prior discussions of the public/private rights
distinction and is satisfied for the reasons described above. If the former, then
the balancing test is a more permissive means of establishing the constitutionality of administrative adjudication.240 For that reason, the fact that patent
rights constitute public rights under the modern Supreme Court test (as explained above) strongly suggests that they satisfy the broader balancing test described in Thomas and Schor.
To the extent that Thomas and Schor articulate a separate Article III test
from the public/private rights distinction, the focus of that test is on “the purposes underlying the requirements of Article III”: (1) individual liberty inter234

Id. at 9-17.
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 493-94 (2011).
236 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986).
237 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
238 Schor, 478 U.S. at 856.
239 See supra Part II.A.2.
240 Schor, 478 U.S. at 847-850 (noting that “the Court has declined to adopt formalistic
and unbending rules” for Article III because doing so “might also unduly constrict Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers.”).
235
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ests “in an impartial and independent federal adjudication of claims”; and (2)
separation of power interests in “preventing the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.”241 To evaluate these issues,
the Court relies on several (albeit non-exclusive) factors: (1) whether the essential attributes of judicial power are reserved to Article III courts; (2) the extent to which the non-Article III forum has the jurisdiction and powers normally vested in an Article III court; (3) the origins and importance of the right to
be adjudicated; (4) the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III; and (5) consent.242 Applying the purposes underlying the Article III requirements and the relevant factors to Patent Office postissuance review proceedings suggests once again that these procedures are
permissible under Article III.
1. Patent Office Post-Issuance Review and Separation of Powers Concerns
Patent Office post-issuance review proceedings pose little threat to separation of powers interests. As explained in Part C, patent rights are federal statutory rights that exist by the grace of Congress.243 To a significant extent, the
power to apportion decision making authority regarding patent rights is part of
Congress’s Article I power to create patent rights and define the terms and
conditions on which patents issue.244 Congress can apportion adjudication of
patent rights to the Article III courts but it can also apportion some of the adjudication to the Patent Office.245 If it does so, there is no threat to separation of
powers interests because Congress is exercising a power provided to it by Article I.
The Supreme Court already considered and rejected the argument that Congress intended post-issuance review proceedings to just be a “surrogate” or
substitute for Article III litigation, concluding instead that their “basic purposes” were to “offer[] a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent.”246 In creating post-issuance review, Congress therefore focused “not on
allocating jurisdiction among federal tribunals”247 but instead on “making effective a specific and limited federal regulatory scheme,” i.e., the Patent Office’s basic regulatory role in limiting patent rights to the permissible scope
and circumstances authorized by the provisions of the Patent Act.248
241

Id. at 834, 847-50.
Id. at 834-35.
243 See supra Part I.C.1.
244 See supra Part I.C.1.
245 Dodge, supra note 127, at 932.
246 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
247 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986).
248 Id. Even academic critics of Patent Office post-issuance review acknowledge that
Congress’s purpose was to eliminate “the worst patents, which probably never should have
242
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Congress chose an administrative alternative “to establish a more efficient
and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”249 The desire for “an inexpensive and expeditious alternative forum” to advance the public policy goals
of a federal statute is exactly the type of Congressional purpose that supports
constitutionality of administrative adjudication under Article III.250 It shows
that there is no threat to separation of powers from Congress “attempt[ing] to
‘transfer jurisdiction to [non-Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating’ constitutional courts” or from “the encroachment or aggrandizement of
one branch at the expense of the other.”251 Rather than trying to undermine the
Article III courts or aggrandize itself, in circumstances like here, Congress is
attempting “only to ensure the effectiveness of th[e] scheme” it created pursuant to its Article I powers.252
Nor in practice does post-issuance review pose much threat of “emasculating” or “encroach[ing]” upon Article III courts or aggrandizing other branches
at the expense of the Article III judiciary. As noted above, the PTAB does not
possess the jurisdiction and powers normally vested in an Article III court. It
is limited to a “particularized area of law” – patent law – and even within this
area is limited solely to the question of patent validity, without any power over
infringement, remedies, or other enforcement issues.253 Its power is further
limited by statutory restrictions on the various post-issuance review proceedings: timing for post-grant review (within nine months of issuance), grounds
for invalidity for ex parte reexamination and inter partes review (anticipation
and obviousness based on written prior art), and types of patents for covered
business method review (non-technological financial data processing).254 Unlike the bankruptcy courts struck down in Northern Pipeline, the PTAB “does
not exercise all ordinary powers of district courts, and thus may not, for instance, preside over jury trials or issue writs of habeas corpus.”255
Moreover, because post-issuance review proceedings are subject to normal
administrative standards of judicial review – substantial evidence for questions
of fact and de novo for questions of law – the essential attributes of judicial
power remain vested in Article III courts, as explained in Part II.B. Patent Office post-issuance review poses less of a threat to separation of powers than
been issued.” Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 910 (2015) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
249 Id. at 910.
250 Schor, 478 U.S. at 855.
251 Id. at 850.
252 Id. at 856.
253 See Part II.C.3, supra.
254 See Part I.A.1, supra.
255 Schor, 478 U.S. at 853.
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Crowell or Thomas, where the Court upheld Congress’s decision to use initial
administrative adjudication to the exclusion of initial adjudication in Article III
courts.256 By contrast, Congress in the AIA did not require that patent validity
issues be litigated in Patent Office post-issuance review proceedings or otherwise significantly encroach on the power of the federal courts to decide patent
validity. “[I]nherent to Congress’ regulatory design” of the modern patent system are “different tracks — one in the Patent Office and one in the courts —
for the review and adjudication of patent claims.”257 The Article III courts thus
retain their traditional power to evaluate validity issues.258 In fact, the Article
III courts have greater power to evaluate validity issues than the PTAB, as
they are not constrained by the statutory restrictions on the various postissuance review proceedings noted in the prior paragraph.
Congress left the choice between Article III and administrative adjudication
exclusively to litigants. Even if administrative adjudication is chosen, the Article III courts can still adjudicate the validity of the challenged patent in parallel, as Article III judges retain the discretion to decide whether or not to stay
litigation pending administrative adjudication.259 The fact that the accused infringer can unilaterally compel administrative adjudication by filing a postissuance review petition may be relevant to the individual liberty concerns of
Article III but does not raise separation of power concerns. Rather, separation
of powers concerns are minimal where, as here, “the decision to invoke this
[administrative] forum is left entirely to the parties and the power of the federal
judiciary to take jurisdiction of these matters is unaffected” because “[i]t is
clear that Congress has not attempted to ‘withdraw from judicial cognizance’
the determination” of patent validity.”260
To be fair, there are ways in which the Patent Office post-issuance review
proceedings look like an encroachment on the power of the Article III courts,
even though they do not ultimately raise the type of separation of power concerns that are constitutionally salient. Patent Office and district court adjudication of patent validity are not fully co-extensive tracks, since parties who do
not satisfy Article III standing can administratively challenge the validity of
issued patents.261 But this does not undermine or interfere with the Article III
256
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985)
(“Crowell held that Congress could replace a seaman’s traditional negligence action in admiralty with a statutory scheme of strict liability . . . [where] claims for compensation would
be determined in an administrative proceeding.”); see also id. at 589 (noting that Congress
in that case could create a right “without providing an Article III adjudication”).
257 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016).
258 Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 272.
259 Id. at 285-87.
260 Schor, 478 U.S. at 854-55.
261 See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143-44.
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courts since, by definition, Article III courts could not adjudicate such challenges. Similarly, the PTAB proceedings can cancel a patent even after an Article III court rejected the invalidity challenge, leading to claims that this is
impermissible administrative review of an Article III court decision.262 But
Article III courts “do not find patents ‘valid,’ only that the patent challenger
did not carry the burden of establishing invalidity in the particular case before
the court.”263 Subsequent invalidation of a patent after an Article III court previously rejected an invalidity challenge is a long-standing feature of the patent
system.264 For nearly forty years, this subsequent invalidation could occur in
an administrative forum.265 Nor does it mean that the Patent Office is impermissibly reviewing or overruling an Article III court when it does so.266 “[T]he
courts and the PTO are not necessarily deciding the same legal question on the
same factual record” because the two forums use different burdens of proof
and claim construction standards and may be presented with different evidence
and arguments.267
More significantly, Patent Office post-issuance review can take some power
away from the Article III courts to decide patent validity. A challenger who
requests post-issuance review in the Patent Office is estopped by a PTAB final
written decision from subsequently challenging the validity of the patent in
civil litigation on “any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could
have raised” in the Patent Office proceedings.268 But the estoppel provisions
only have a limited impact on the power of the Article III courts. They only
apply when the PTAB reaches a final written decision before the Article III

262

See Golden, supra note 1, at 1658-59.
Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 n.3 (1988) [hereinafter Ethicon]
264 See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (2008) (“Therefore, a prior holding of validity is not necessarily inconsistent with a subsequent holding of validity, and is not binding
on subsequent litigation or PTO reexaminations.”)
265 See Translogic Tech., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 250 Fed. Appx. 988 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (ordering dismissal of infringement litigation where Patent Office found patent invalid after
district court decision finding it not invalid); Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1428-29 (“[I]f the district
court determines that a patent is not invalid, the PTO should continue its reexamination . . .”).
266 See Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1378-79 (rejecting the argument that continuing reexamination after a finding of no invalidity by a district court constituted impermissible review of
an Article III court by an administrative agency).
267 Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 277; see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.
Ct. 2131, 2143-44 (2016).
268 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (describing estoppel with inter partes review); 35 U.S.C.
§ 325(e)(2) (2012) (describing estoppel with post-grant review); see also AIA § 18 (estoppel
from covered business method patent review limited to grounds that were “raised” in Patent
Office).
263
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court reaches final judgment269 and, even then, they do not eliminate all possible invalidity challenges. Most importantly, estoppel is personal to the challenger and in no way impacts the Article III court’s power to hear invalidity
challenges raised by other parties. The estoppel provisions thus focus on limiting the power of challengers to raise invalidity, with incidental limits on the
power of Article III courts not demonstrating an effort to undermine those
courts.
Finally, by creating a parallel administrative track for challenging the validity of issued patents, Congress has reduced the Article III courts’ traditional
primacy in adjudicating issued patents.270 But the idea that Article III courts
traditionally had exclusive authority to adjudicate the validity of issued patents
is incorrect. The Patent Office long had the authority to adjudicate priority issues related to issued patents in interferences, and since 1952 had the specific
power to cancel issued patents on the grounds of lack of novelty for prior invention by another. Nearly forty years ago, Congress expanded this power to
include lack of novelty or non-obviousness based on written prior art in reexamination. The AIA post-issuance review proceedings are the latest iteration
of this parallel administrative track for challenging issued patents. Because
patent rights are federal statutory rights, Congress has significant authority under Article I to define the mode and forum for enforcement. That Congress
traditionally chose the Article III courts as the primary forum for deciding the
validity of issued patents does not prevent it from subsequently reapportioning
authority between the Article III courts and the Patent Office.271 Doing so
would not threaten separation of powers because it is inherent in Congress’s
Article I powers.272
2. Patent Office Post-Issuance Review and Individual Liberty Concerns
Patent Office post-issuance review raises greater concerns about the individual liberty interests protected by Article III than it does the separation of
powers concerns. Article III’s liberty function seeks to guarantee “independent
and impartial adjudication” before a decision maker “free from potential domi269

See Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 290.
See MCM Portfolio Petition, supra note 66, at 18 (No. 15-1330) (emphasizing that
“[p]atent rights have existed for centuries, and for centuries their validity has been adjudicated in courts” in challenging constitutionality of inter partes review).
271 Compare Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53-55 (1932) (describing the ability of
Congress to change the mode of enforcement pursuant to its Article I admiralty powers);
with Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 52 (1989) (suggesting that Congress
cannot reapportion common law claims in a way that would eliminate the jury trial right).
272 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 53-55 (finding that Congress did not exceed its Article I admiralty powers in changing the procedure for enforcing rights and thereby relieving the Article
III courts of some of their authority).
270
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nation by other branches of government.”273 In the patent context, a challenger
can force adjudication, and potentially cancellation, of the patentee’s property
interest in the patent by PTAB judges lacking the protections of Article III.
This raises concern about the possible lack of independence of the PTAB or
political domination by the executive branch. Although “Article III does not
confer on litigants an absolute right to the plenary consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III court,”274 there is reason for greater concern in
the PTAB context than in Crowell, Schor, or Thomas, the major Supreme
Court cases addressing adjudication by administrative agencies under Article
III. In Crowell and Schor, the agencies were independent agencies intentionally created to be protected against political pressure.275 In Thomas, disputes
were adjudicated outside the relevant administrative agency (the EPA) by an
arbitrator selected by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, an independent agency, from its roster of arbitrators.276
Unlike in these prior cases, the PTO is an executive branch agency within
the Department of Commerce, and the PTAB judges are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Director of the Patent and
Trademark Office, both of whom are political appointees that serve at the
pleasure of the President.277 In fact, the Director and Deputy Director of the
PTO (also a political appointee278) are themselves deemed members of the
PTAB,279 though their actual participation is minimal.280 Because the PTAB is
273

CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986).
Id.
275 In Crowell, the agency was the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission, which was a bipartisan independent agency with commissioners serving six-year
terms. 285 U.S. 22 at 42 (1932); see also UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 568-69
(1945), https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ATO/USGM/USECC.html (last checked Apr. 11,
2017) [https://perma.cc/782P-FAVT]. In Schor, the CFTC was an independent agency and
there was a “perception that the CFTC was relatively immune from political pressures.” 478
U.S. at 855.
276 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 574 n.1 (1985); see
also
About
Us,
FEDERAL
MEDIATION
AND
CONCILIATION
SERVICE,
https://www.fmcs.gov/aboutus/. [https://perma.cc/W784-YR4H] (last checked Apr. 11,
2017).
277 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2011); see also 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1), (4) (2011)(noting that the Director may be removed by the President).
278 Dennis Crouch, USPTO Transitions and Traditions, PATENTLYO (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/01/uspto-transitions-traditions.html.
[https://perma.cc/3QVK-APZN].
279 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2011).
280 See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Precedent and Process in the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, PATENTLYO (May 10, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/05/precedentprocess-patent.html [https://perma.cc/H6B3-WGD4] (describing Director and Deputy Direc274
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composed of Administrative Patent Judges, not Administrative Law Judges
subject to significant statutory protections, the PTO Director determines PTAB
judges’ salary, performance review, discipline, and removal.281 Moreover,
since non-ALJ administrative judges, like PTAB judges, are “less insulated
from an administrative agency’s more characteristic political appointees,” they
“are generally not subject to the APA’s prohibition of ex parte communications
‘with agency officials during and about their hearings’,” and political appointees may even be able to designate particular panels of PTAB judges to hear
particular cases.282 On the other hand, political appointees cannot dictate a
PTAB judge’s vote in any specific case.283
Despite these greater concerns about the possible lack of independence or
executive branch domination of the PTAB than in the leading Supreme Court
cases, there are several reasons to think the Patent Office post-issuance reviewing proceedings do not pose a threat to individual liberty that rises to the level
of constitutional significance. As an initial matter, there is no evidence of an
actual lack of independence or political domination. In contending that
“[p]atentees are justified in believing that the agency puts its thumb on the
scales” in post-issuance proceedings, challengers to the constitutionality of
PTAB proceedings rely only on high invalidity rates in post-issuance review
proceedings, such as the fact that over 80% of final written decisions in inter
partes review result in cancelled claims.284 But this high invalidation rate is
just as likely the result of other, less problematic factors, including the threshold standards that must be satisfied for post-issuance review proceedings to be
initiated, selection effects in what patents are challenged in post-issuance review, and the potential prevalence of the improperly granted patents that Congress sought to address.285 Indeed, only 25% of challenged claims are invalidated in inter partes review.286 In sum, there is no actual evidence of political
influence of PTAB decisions.
More importantly, there are Article III protections against the potential lack
tor as ex officio members of PTAB).
281 Golden, supra note 1, at 1662-63, 1681-82.
282 Id. at 1663, 1682. Although a pre-AIA Federal Circuit case suggests the Patent Office’s political appointees could select panels in hopes of achieving a particular result, there
may be due process limitations. Id. at 1663-64.
283
Id. at 1663 (describing pre-AIA Federal Circuit case but suggesting it applies to postAIA proceedings).
284 See, e.g., Cooper Petition, supra note 66, at 10.
285 See Colleen V. Chien & Christian Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design of
Post-Grant Patent Reviews 1 (May 3, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Social
Science Research Network) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2601562.) [https://perma.cc/892BB2AV].
286 Id.
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of independence of the PTAB or political domination by the executive. As explained above, PTAB decisions are subject to appellate review under normal
administrative review standards – substantial evidence for facts and de novo
for law – in the Article III Federal Circuit.287 This Article III appellate review
serves as a check to prevent overtly political decision making or political domination of the PTAB by the executive.288 In fact, the structure of appellate review of PTAB decisions insulates those decisions from political influence to a
greater degree than under the standard administrative model. Administrative
decisions are frequently subject to intermediate review by a person or small
body that represents the views of the agency as whole, which often is political
appointees.289 In the case of the Patent Office, the standard administrative
model would suggest intermediate review of PTAB decisions by the politically-appointed PTO Director.290 However, the AIA provides only for direct review of PTAB decisions by the Federal Circuit, giving the PTO Director the
opportunity to intervene as party on appeal without “conferring on the PTO’s
Director an independent, adjudicatory power to review PTAB decisions” as is
typical in the administrative state.291 “By failing to provide explicitly for appeal to the Director and instead providing for direct appeal to the Federal Circuit, Congress arguably placed the Federal Circuit in the authoritative position”
with regards to PTAB proceedings.292 This authoritative position for Article
III judges mitigates the concerns about the PTAB’s potential lack of independence or political domination by the executive.
The nature of patent rights also mitigates concerns about the individual liberty interests protected by Article III. As noted above, the Constitution permits, but does not require, Congress to create patent rights on the terms and
287

See supra Part II.B.
See Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding
that Article III de novo review of law and substantial evidence review of facts supported
constitutionality of administrative adjudication because “[a]n appropriate level of judicial
review ensures that Article III courts retain the appearance and reality of control over the
interpretation, declaration, and application of federal law” (quotations and alterations omitted)); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III,
101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 947 (1988) (Article III “[a]ppellate review can provide an effective
check against politically influenced adjudication, arbitrary and self-interested decisionmaking . . . help[ing] ensure fairness to litigants . . .”); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 47 (1937) (holding that judicial review of jurisdictional, constitutional,
and statutory authority issues “afford[ed] adequate opportunity to secure judicial protection
against arbitrary action” by the administrative agency even though agency factual findings
were conclusive).
289 Golden, supra note 1, at 1680-81.
290 Id. at 1680.
291 Id. at 1682-83.
292 Id. at 1683.
288
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conditions that Congress deems appropriate to advance the public policy goals
underlying the patent system.293 If Congress could combat the concerns about
an excessive number of weak patents that never should have issued by raising
the standards of patentability or imposing greater procedures during initial examination, which it undoubtedly could have done,294 then it is unclear what
prevents Congress from addressing these concerns by creating an administrative “proceeding [that] offers a second look at an earlier administrative grant of
a patent.”295
Indeed, English patents starting in the 1600s included revocation clauses
under which “the crown or its arm – the Privy Council – had power to revoke a
patent upon proof of ‘inconveniency,’” which included lack of novelty as well
as general prejudice to the realm, like detrimental effects for a particular trade
or taking away too many jobs.296 The revocation proceedings “seem to have
been much closer in nature to executive examinations of utility and policy rather than strictly legal proceedings in the modern sense” and occurred before
the Privy Council, the closest equivalent to the modern administrative agency,
into at least the late 1700s, with the Privy Council having but rarely exercising
the power into the mid-1800s at least.297 Similarly, during the Articles of Confederation, “at least in some states where the issue arose it seems to have been
assumed that patents were revocable. “The presumption there was that what
the legislature’s discretion could award in the patent grant could also be taken
away by the same power.”298 I have been unable to find any historical evidence that the American patent system departed from this historical understanding of the authority of the legislature to revoke patents it granted on policy grounds, even if Congress did not generally use this power until the early
1980s.
That issued patents create a property right in the owner does not change the
analysis. As discussed above, the patentee’s property right is created by federal statute and, under Section 261, is expressly made “[s]ubject to the provisions
of this title.”299 Since the early 1980s, “the provisions of this title” have included administrative cancellation of issued patents. Thus, for virtually every
293

See supra Part II.C.1.
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Within the limits
of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the
Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional
aim. . . . Within the scope established by the Constitution, Congress may set out conditions
and tests for patentability.”).
295 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
296 Bracha, supra note 182, at 21-23.
297 Id. at 22, 60, 61 n.129.
298 Id. at 110.
299 See supra Part II.C.1; 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
294
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patent still in force, the possibility of administrative cancellation of the patent
is subsumed in the property right created by the patent. The nature of the patent rights thus suggest that administrative cancellation, even if potentially influenced by the executive branch, does not threaten the patentee’s liberty interests in its patent rights.
Relatedly, consent also mitigates, at least to some extent, the individual liberty concerns with Patent Office post-issuance review proceedings. “[A]s a
personal right, Article III’s guarantee of an impartial and independent federal
adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are other personal constitutional rights
that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal matters must be
tried.”300 Thus, a party can expressly waive Article III adjudication by demanding that an issue be litigated in the non-Article III forum.301 In the Patent
Office post-issuance review proceedings, the accused infringer or other party
challenging the validity of the patent expressly waives Article III adjudication
by petitioning for post-issuance review.
But the real question is whether the patentee has consented in any way to
administrative review and cancellation of issued patents. In Schor, the Supreme Court held even in the absence of an express waiver, Schor impliedly
waived Article III protections for counterclaims asserted against him when he
chose the benefits of proceeding in the administrative forum for his claim, rather than the available district court litigation, “with full knowledge that the
CFTC would exercise jurisdiction over” counterclaims against him. 302 At least
an arguable analogy exists in the context of Patent Office post-issuance review.
Patentees voluntarily choose the benefits of the federal patent system, rather
than protecting their inventions through non-patent mechanisms like trade secrets, tacit knowledge, contract, or trademarks.303 For virtually all patents still
in force (i.e., those filed after the creation of reexamination), patentees have
chosen to enter the patent system “with full knowledge” that issued patents
were subject to administrative cancellation in the Patent Office. By voluntarily
seeking patent protection, patentees arguably consented to administrative review and cancellation of issued patents.
This consent argument is clearly more attenuated than in Schor. Additionally, patent protection offers far more significant benefits than non-patent appropriation mechanisms and some types of inventions will be difficult to effective300

CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1986).
Id. at 849 (“Schor indisputably waived any right he may have possessed to the full
trial of Conti’s counterclaim before an Article III court. Schor expressly demanded that
Conti proceed on its counterclaim in the [administrative] reparations proceeding rather than
before the District Court . . .”).
302 Id. at 850.
303 See Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 76876 (2012) (describing non-patent appropriation mechanisms).
301
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ly protect without the exclusive rights of a patent.304 One might reasonably argue that the consent is not truly voluntary but is instead compelled by the substantial benefits, and sometimes necessity, of patent protection.
However, the case law is supportive of implied consent in situations similar
to that in the patent context. In Thomas, the Court emphasized that the pesticide manufacturers were “voluntary participants in the program” in upholding
administrative adjudication, even though manufacturers were required to register their pesticides with the EPA and failure to accept administrative adjudication resulted in either cancellation of the pesticide registration (if the follow-on
manufacturer) or use of the data without compensation (if the original manufacturer).305 The voluntariness in Thomas thus is similarly attenuated and
compelled to that of Patent Office post-issuance review. One commentator has
described (and criticized) the current state of law on consent as follows:
“[T]he use of consent as a basis for non-Article III adjudication has repeatedly
resulted in Congress utilizing its power as systems designer to coercively obtain consent to modifications that would otherwise be unconstitutional.”306
Circuit level decisions provide further support for a finding of patentee consent. The Seventh Circuit upheld, against an Article III challenge, the requirement that commodities brokers submit to customer-initiated arbitration as
a condition for participating in the commodities exchange (with discipline and
expulsion from the exchange possible if the broker refused arbitration).307 The
Seventh Circuit found consent from voluntary participation in the exchange,
even though that “if Geldermann was to continue in business it had no choice
but to accept” arbitration.308 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit subsequently found
that an individual broker waived Article III protections and consented to arbitration simply by accepting employment with a regulated firm.309 These cases
demonstrate that consent to non-Article III adjudication can occur long in advance of the dispute at issue and can be compelled as a result of economic necessity.
Thus, the argument for consent is not as strong as in Schor, and therefore
might not alone be sufficient to satisfy the individual liberty concerns of Article III, as was true in Schor.310 But the case law suggests that a patentee who
voluntarily seeks patent protection knowing the risk of administrative cancella304

See id. (noting shortcomings in non-patent appropriation mechanisms).
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985); see also Geldermann, Inc. v. CFTC, 836 F.2d 310, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Geldermann] (interpreting Thomas as finding consent despite “economic compulsion”).
306 Dodge, supra note 127, at 911.
307 Geldermann, 836 F.2d at 311-12, 315.
308 Id. at 316-18.
309 Belom v. Nat’l Futures Ass’n, 284 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2002).
310 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1986).
305
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tion of issued patents has provided at least some measure of consent to the subsequent adjudication and cancellation of their patent rights in a non-Article III
tribunal. This consent is at least a factor suggesting administrative adjudication does not pose a threat to the individual liberty interests protected by Article III.
3. Reaching a Conclusion on Patent Office Post-Issuance Review
The analysis in the prior sections helps inform the ultimate Article III conclusion under the Schor/Thomas balancing test, but it does not itself produce a
definite answer. The Supreme Court in Schor noted that “in reviewing Article
III challenges, we have weighed a number of factors, none of which has been
deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional
action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.”311 The question remains as to how the various factors described above
balance out.
Patent Office post-issuance review raises virtually no separation of powers
concerns, for the reasons described in Section 1. The fact that one of the two
purposes of Article III is barely implicated by post-issuance review would
seem to weigh heavily in favor of constitutionality. However, the Supreme
Court indicated that Article III’s protections “serve[]to protect primarily personal, rather than structural, interests.”312 The strongest argument against the
constitutionality of post-issuance review – that PTAB judges lack independence from executive branch political appointees – implicates the personal interests at the core of Article III.313 Ultimately, however, the structure of Patent
Office post-issuance review does not seem to be a significant enough threat to
impartial adjudication free from domination by the executive branch because
of the protections provided by Article III appellate review; the significant control Congress has to tailor patent rights to advance public policy goals; and the
presence of implicit consent to administrative review and cancellation of issued patents by patentees voluntarily choosing to participate in the patent system.314
In sum, the balance of factors weighs fairly heavily in favor of the constitutionality of Patent Office post-issuance review under Article III, though the indeterminacy of the Schor/Thomas balancing test makes a definite conclusion
impossible. To the extent there is any doubt, the balancing test can be seen as
incorporating a measure of deference to Congress in structuring adjudication,
311

Id. at 851.
Id. at 848.
313 See supra Part II.D.2.
314 See id.; see also Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding that other factors outweighed concerns about potential political domination by executive branch in making administrative adjudication constitutional).
312
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with Congress’s decision being upheld unless irrational or unreasonable.315
Deference would seem particularly appropriate with regards to Congress’s decision to permit adjudication and cancellation of issued patents in the PTAB.
The only real basis for Article III concern is the use of Administrative Patent
Judges that lack not only Article III protections, but also the statutory protections provided to ALJs. However, “PTAB trials fall into a large class of administrative proceedings – apparently common in the U.S. administrative state
– that . . . feature administrative judges that are not ALJs.”316 Giving controlling, or even significant, weight to the executive branch’s potential control
over PTAB judges could pose a significant threat to the modern administrative
state, contrary to the Supreme Court’s suggestion that the realities of the modern administrative state must be accounted for in crafting Article III standards.317
III. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND POST-ISSUANCE REVIEW
Article III is the relevant constitutional provision for the concerns that have
been raised about Patent Office adjudication and cancellation of issued patents,
since it polices Congressional apportionment of adjudication to the political
branches instead of the judiciary. For the reasons explained in Part II, Patent
Office post-issuance review is likely constitutional under Article III. Yet,
those challenging the constitutionality of Patent Office post-issuance review
proceedings have raised additional constitutional arguments under the Seventh
Amendment, the Takings Clause, and the IP Clause. For sake of completeness,
this Part addresses and rejects these arguments in turn.
A. The Seventh Amendment and Post-Issuance Review
Patent validity is widely believed to be an issue on which the Seventh
Amendment guarantees a right to trial by jury in infringement actions with
damages at stake, although Professor Mark Lemley recently cast doubt on this
assumption.318 The PTAB does not use juries when adjudicating the validity of
issued patents. Unsurprisingly, those dissatisfied with Patent Office postissuance review have repeatedly argued that PTAB adjudication of the validity
of issued patents violates the patentee’s Seventh Amendment jury trial right,
often focusing even more on the Seventh Amendment than Article III.319 The
limited academic commentary also worries about the Seventh Amendment im315

Bator, supra note 102, at 257.
Golden, supra note 1, at 1682.
317 See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985).
318 Lemley, supra note 181, at 1674.
319 MCM Portfolio Petition, supra note 66, at 18-19 (No. 15-1330); Oil States Petition,
supra note 66, at 12-19 (No. 16-712).
316
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plications of Patent Office post-issuance review. Professor Mark Janis, foreshadowing the type of post-issuance review created by the AIA, worried that
what he called “second generation reexamination” would be subject to Seventh
Amendment challenges, though he remained agnostic on the likely outcome of
these challenges.320
Regardless of the applicability of the Seventh Amendment jury trial right to
patent validity issues in federal district court litigation, the Seventh Amendment does not pose an independent constitutional barrier (beyond Article III) to
administrative adjudication and cancellation of issued patents. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that “the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible
with the whole concept of administrative adjudication and would substantially
interfere with the . . . . [agency’s] role in the statutory scheme.”321 This line of
cases makes clear that the right to a jury trial varies depending on the forum
Congress chooses for adjudication. If Congress provides for administrative adjudication of a statutory right (like patent rights), it can do so “free from the
strictures of the Seventh Amendment.”322 But if Congress provided for adjudication of the same statutory right in the federal district courts, “a jury trial must
be available if the action involves rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an action at law.”323 For that reason, even if the Seventh Amendment
requires a jury trial when patent validity is raised in district court infringement
litigation, it does not mean that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial
when patent validity is raised in administrative proceedings like Patent Office
post-issuance review.
The Supreme Court in Granfinanciera clarified, but did not challenge, the
Court’s prior holding that the Seventh Amendment is “generally” inapplicable
in administrative adjudication.324 Granfinanciera identified a two-step process
320

Janis, supra note 48, at 89-92.
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974) [hereinafter Curtis]; see also Pernell
v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974) (confirming “the principle that the Seventh
Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury trials would
be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication” and assuming “that
the Seventh Amendment would not be a bar to a congressional effort to entrust landlordtenant disputes, including those over the right to possession, to an administrative agency.”).
322 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194-95.
323 Id. at 195; see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977)
(“[W]hen Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign their adjudication to
an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating
the Seventh Amendment’s injunction that jury trial is to be ‘preserved’ in ‘suits at common
law’ . . . . even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned to a federal court of law instead of an administrative agency.”).
324 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194.
321
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for evaluating whether a claim could be administratively adjudicated without a
jury.325 First, the Court determines whether the claim would require a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment if litigated in the federal district courts using
the Court’s normal Seventh Amendment “historical” test of determining
whether the action or its analog was tried at law or in equity in 18th century
England and whether the remedy sought is legal or equitable in nature.326 The
answer to this question does not end the inquiry; the Court then proceeds to the
“second stage of this analysis [which] is more important than the first.”327
Even if a party would be entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment
in federal district court, the Court then “must decide whether Congress may
assign and has assigned resolution of the relevant claim to a non-Article III adjudicative body that does not use a jury as factfinder.”328
The answer to this second question, according to Granfinanciera, depends
on the public rights/private rights distinction – Congress can assign public
rights for administrative adjudication but cannot “strip parties contesting matters of private right of their constitutional right to a trial by jury.”329 Granfinanciera therefore concluded that the Seventh Amendment question in the administrative context collapses into the Article III question: “the question
whether the Seventh Amendment permits Congress to assign its adjudication to
a tribunal that does not employ juries as factfinders requires the same answer
as the question whether Article III allows Congress to assign adjudication of
that cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal.”330
However, other Supreme Court cases have suggested that permissible nonArticle III adjudication may extend beyond public rights to include private
rights in some circumstances,331 raising the possibility of a gap in which administrative adjudication would be permissible under Article III but not under
the Seventh Amendment. Granfinanciera itself closed this potential gap.
Granfinanciera noted that although some cases permitted administrative adjudication of “private rights,” those cases were using a different definition of
public and private rights, and under Granfinanciera’s definition, described in
Part II.A.2, supra, those cases involved public rights.332 In essence, Granfinanciera recharacterized other tests for Article III adjudication in the Court’s
precedent as merely means for defining the line between public rights and pri-

325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332

Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 53.
See Part II.A.2, supra.
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 55 n.10.
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vate rights.333 Thus, “if Congress may assign the adjudication of a statutory
cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal [under the Article III precedent],
then the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of
that action by a nonjury factfinder.”334
The challenges to Patent Office post-issuance review under the Seventh
Amendment sidestep the import of the Supreme Court’s Seventh Amendment
precedent in the administrative context by focusing primarily on the historical
test for determining the right to a jury trial in federal district court (i.e., whether the claim or its analog was resolved at law or in equity in the 18th century
and involves legal or equitable remedies) and then contending that this historical test is also the controlling inquiry for Article III purposes.335 This is directly contrary to Granfinanciera, which held that the historical test was only the
first, less important, step and, even if there was a right to a jury in federal court
under the historical test, the court must still use the public/private rights distinction to determine whether Congress could assign the claim for administrative adjudication without a jury.336 The Seventh Circuit specifically rejected
an approach similar to that made in the challenges to Patent Office postissuance review, where the district court first resolved the Seventh Amendment
issue under the historical test and then concluded it did not need to separately
address the Article III issue.337 The Seventh Circuit concluded that “[t]he district court resolved the problem backwards. The court should have first addressed the issue of whether Geldermann had the right to an Article III forum;
then if it ruled that no such right existed, it need not have addressed Geldermann’s Seventh Amendment claim,” since “the Seventh Amendment is not
implicated” without a right to an Article III forum.338
Thus, the Seventh Amendment poses no greater constitutional barrier to Pa333

See Part II.A.2, supra.
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53-54.
335 MCM Portfolio Petition, supra note 66, at 18-21 (No. 15-1330); Oil States Petition,
supra note 66, at 12-17 (No. 16-712); see also Rothwell, supra note 11, at 381-383 (conducting Seventh Amendment historical analysis and then suggesting it governs Article III).
336 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42.
337 Geldermann, Inc. v. CFTC, 836 F.2d 310, 323 (7th Cir. 1987).
338 Id. at 323-24. The Fifth Circuit once suggested that “[t]he test for whether an Article
III court is necessary for an action at law is the same as the test for whether a party has a
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial,” which was the historical test of whether it was “a
suit that would have been tried at common law in England in 1789.” In re Clay, 35 F.3d
190, 194 (5th Cir. 1994). The court’s statement was dicta, since it rested its decision on
statutory grounds. Id. at 196-198. In a subsequent case, the Fifth Circuit, consistent with
Granfinanciera, indicated that the historical test was just the first step and the court must
still consider whether Congress can assign the claim to a non-Article III forum without a
jury based on the public/private rights distinction. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Verizon
Comm’ns, Inc., 761 F.3d 409, 416-417 (5th Cir. 2014).
334
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tent Office adjudication and cancellation of issued patents than Article III. Because Congress can assign patent validity to Patent Office post-issuance proceedings under Article III, Patent Office post-issuance review necessarily does
not deny patentees their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
B. The IP Clause and Post-Issuance Review
Although not the focus of challenges to administrative adjudication and cancellation of issued patents, there are occasional suggestions that Patent Office
post-issuance review violates the IP Clause of the Constitution.339 The IP
Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”340 On this view, the
power to secure rights in inventions by granting patents does not include the
power to destroy rights in inventions by cancelling patents.341
This argument is a non-starter. The Constitution is permissive with regard
to patent rights. Congress is permitted to create patent rights but is not required to do so, any more than it is required to declare war just because it has
the power to do so. For that reason, the Constitution leaves to Congress the
decision as to the terms and conditions on which rights in an invention are “secured” by a patent.342 Post-issuance administrative cancellation for failure to
comply with the statutory requirements of patentability appears to be a legitimate condition that can be imposed by Congress.
In fact, the IP Clause limits the patent rights that Congress can create, prohibiting it from “enlarg[ing] the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby” or “authoriz[ing] the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”343 The
Supreme Court has characterized Patent Office post-issuance review as “a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent” that “helps protect the
public’s paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies are kept within
339

See MCM Portfolio Petition, supra note 66, at 25 (No. 15-1330) (arguing that postissuance review “attempts to achieve an objective that is not squarely encompassed within
Congress’s power” under the IP Clause); Adam Ullman, Have U.S. Patent Laws Become
Unconstitutional?,
IP
WATCHDOG
(Nov.
6,
2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/11/06/u-s-patent-laws-becomeunconstitutional/id=74462/ (suggesting that “the America Invents Act, IPRs, and other legislative reform” are unconstitutional under the IP Clause).
340 U.S. Const. Art. I § 8.
341 See MCM Portfolio Petition, supra note 66, at 25 (No. 15-1330); Ullman, supra note
339.
342 See supra Part II.C.1.
343 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)..
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their legitimate scope.”344 Thus, Patent Office post-issuance review does not
violate the IP Clause but rather is fully consistent with it.
C. Takings Clause
Finally, there has been concern in some quarters that the administrative adjudication and cancellation of patent rights constitutes a taking of private property for a public use without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.345 The Takings Clause does not render Patent Office postissuance review unconstitutional for three key reasons.
First, for patents issued after the enactment of the AIA post-issuance review
proceedings, there is no possible takings claim because the property rights
granted to the patentee included the possibility of subsequent cancellation by
the PTAB.346 Nothing was taken that the patentee previously possessed. At
most, therefore, the Takings Clause would limit Patent Office post-issuance
review to patents issued before the enactment of the AIA.347
Second, even assuming that the AIA post-issuance review proceedings constitute a Fifth Amendment taking, post-issuance review is not unconstitutional.
The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the taking of private property for public use, but instead only such a taking without just compensation. For that reason, “[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private
property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation
can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking.”348 Absent a
Congressional intent to withdraw the remedy (which is not present in the AIA),
a party can seek just compensation for a taking by the federal government in
the United States Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act.349 Of
course, if just compensation for the cancellation of pre-AIA patents in postissuance review were likely to be necessary, Congress might voluntarily modify or eliminate post-issuance review.350 But there is “no constitutional infirmity” in Patent Office post-issuance review under the Takings Clause because “a
Tucker Act remedy is available to provide . . . just compensation” in the Court

344

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
See, e.g., Gregory Dolin & Irena D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
719 (2016).
346
See id. (recognizing there is no takings issue with post-grant review because it only
applies prospectively and is therefore incorporated into the property right created by a patent).
347 See id. (recognizing that limiting post-issuance review to post-AIA patents would
eliminate any Takings Clause issues).
348 Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) [hereinafter Ruckelhaus].
349 Id. at 1016-1019 (1984).
350 See Dolin & Manta, supra note 345, at 795.
345
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of Federal Claims.351
Third, if a takings claim seeking just compensation for a taking based on
administrative cancellation of a pre-AIA patent were brought in the Court of
Federal Claims, it would be unlikely to succeed. The mere fact that the patent
was cancelled post-issuance would not constitute a taking because the property
right granted in a patent never included the right to be free from post-issuance
cancellation. Patents have always been subject to invalidation in district court
litigation and, for virtually all patents still in force, in ex parte reexamination.
A takings claim, even for a pre-AIA patent, would only be possible if the AIA
proceedings cancelled a patent that would not have been cancelled in district
court litigation or reexamination. Thus, the argument would have to be that the
combination in the PTAB of a lower burden of proof than litigation, a different
claim construction stand than litigation, and a more restricted opportunity to
amend claims than reexamination caused the patent to be cancelled when it
would not have been cancelled in district court litigation or reexamination.352
The odds that many, if any, patentees could prove this in a Tucker Act action
in the Court of Federal Claims is questionable.
Even if the patentee could prove that its patent was cancelled in the PTAB
when it would not have been cancelled in district court litigation or ex parte
reexamination, they would still have to prove that this changed risk of invalidation rose to the level of a taking under the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence. That question is beyond the scope of this Article for the reason explained above – even if a taking occurred, post-issuance review is not
unconstitutional due to the Tucker Act remedy. For present purposes, it is
enough to note that a patentee would face an uphill battle in establishing a taking in this context under the Supreme Court precedent.353
Conclusion
The uncertainty resulting from the Supreme Court’s confused Article III jurisprudence makes definite predictions in this area impossible. However, the
best conclusion from a careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s precedent is
that Congress’s creation of Patent Office adjudication and cancellation of issued patents, whether via the AIA procedures or prior means, is constitutionally permissible under Article III, the Seventh Amendment, and other constitutional provisions. In fact, a contrary conclusion would not just undermine the
patent system created by Congress pursuant to its Article I powers but would
also threaten significant portions of the modern administrative state, given that
351

Ruckelhaus, 467 U.S. at 1020.
See Dolin & Manta, supra note 345, at 781-87.
353 Id. (acknowledging difficulty of argument but believing patentee could succeed);
Camilla A. Hrdy & Ben Picozzi, The AIA Is Not a Taking: A Response to Dolin & Manta,
72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 472 (2016) (doubting that a patentee could successfully
establish a taking).
352
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Patent Office post-issuance review is well within the mainstream of administrative adjudication. The Supreme Court has shown little inclination to undo
the modern administrative state through its Article III precedent.
Although specific practices or procedures in Patent Office post-issuance review proceedings may be subject to procedural due process challenges, the
post-issuance review proceedings themselves are constitutionally sound. The
extent of constitutional challenges that have been made to Patent Office postissuance review, and the favorable reception these constitutional arguments
have received within the patent community, seem to have little connection to
the merits of these challenges. Rather, they seem more the result of unhappiness with Congress’s policy choice to create Patent Office post-issuance review pursuant to its Article I powers, as well as the results of post-issuance reviews, especially frequent invalidation of patents.

